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POTENTIAL DESTROYER OF CRIME'
Russell Baker*

W

crime is committed with a view toward profit,
there can be no question but what syndicated or commercialized criminal operations are carried on in this country because
of the vast sums of money to be gained from such activities. One
does not need to search reports issued by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or by police chiefs to learn that the cost of crime
runs into billions each year. Hearings conducted by investigating
committees have made the American public conscious of the fact
that the cost of commercialized crime to the nation lies not solely
in terms of dollars diverted from lawful affairs to syndicate
treasuries. The public is now aware of the shocking consequences
which arise from that degree of bribery, leading to public corruption and demoralization in high places, which organized criminal
elements have perpetrated in an effort to remain able to garner
huge illegal profits. If it could be shown, as the old saying goes,
that the game is not worth the candle, if public officials could be
taught that the accepter of bribes is not to profit from his breach
of public trust, the collapse of organized crime would soon follow.
Deprived of all chance to profit, few criminals would be foolish
enough to continue in activities that could lead to no gainful end.
HILE NOT ALL

* Member, Illinois Bar. Secretary, Chicago Crime Commission; Librarian, Chicago
Law Institute. Author: Manual on the Law of Arrest, Search and Seizure (Chicago
Crime Commission, 1949). See also Baker, "An Equitable Remedy to Combat
Gambling in Illinois," 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 287-303 (1950), and "The
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation: A Problem In the Law of Sales," 22 Tul.
L. Rev. 229-63 (1947).
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Society, for years, has acted on the proposition that efficient
enforcement of criminal laws, the imposition of criminal sanctions,
should be enough to suppress crime. But punishment has proved
to be no deterrent to crime except in isolated instances. The
imposition of fines, the assessment of short terms of imprisonment
against its minions, have come to be regarded by syndicate heads
as no more than another item of "overhead" in the syndicate
budget. Even the moral influence of public disgrace has tended
to disappear before the presence of accumulated wealth, despite
the illegal nature of its origin. Besides, piecemeal attacks on the
outwardly flagrant manifestations of crime! nibble only at the
fringes and never reach the heart. The only telling blow that
society will ever strike, at least against the hydra-headed menace
of commercialized crime, will occur when the source of profit is
shut off, when the life-sustaining blood of dollars is stopped from
flowing in its veins.
It is at this point that one reaches the thought of taxing
illegal enterprises out of existence. No greater truism was ever
spoken than the one uttered by Chief Justice Marshall when he
announced that ''the power to tax involves the power to destroy." 2
Effectively used, lawful taxation could destroy most crime by
drying up its well-spring, by eliminating its profit-motivating
force. It is, therefore, proposed to examine whether proper tax
laws could be devised capable of reaching that result. The subject
could be put into understandable limits if one particular phase of
organized crime be subjected to tax scrutiny. It is acknowledged,
however, that all forms of syndicated crime would be open to the
views herein expressed. The present center of interest in the
1 The attempt to shut off the operation of slot machines by forbidding the transportation of such machines, or the parts thereof, in interstate commerce under S. B.
3357, Ch. 1194, Pub. Law 906, approved January 2, 1951, U. S. Cong. Serv. 1950,
Vol. 1, pp. 1234-6, illustrates the "piecemeal" method of attack. While the statute
reflects congressional awareness of a deplorable situation and a willingness to take
measures against its continuance, it is likely to have little value in the suppression
of intrastate crime involving such devices. If anything, it tends to encourage more
crime by stimulating the gambling syndicates to "high-jack" existing machines
located in private hands to recoup losses brought about by official seizure and
destruction Uf those slot machines found operating in public places.
2McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 at 431, 4 L. Ed. 579 at 607
(1819).
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national field being the commercialized business of gambling,
thanks to the high-lighting it has received at the hands of the
Kefauver Committee, it has been selected for examination from
the tax standpoint.
Many have urged that law enforcement in relation to gambling
has become something of a farce, as was the case with prohibition,
because the public wants to gamble. The existence of an all too
human impulse to want to take a chance, whether it be at the risk
of life in an automobile hurtling over a highway or at the risk of
financial loss in some speculative activity, is well enough known to
call for no denial. Whether the urge is psychologically inherent
in every human being or is inculcated by an earlier successful
experience at chance-taking is something which need not here be
inquired into. Threat of taxation will probably never serve to
stop social card-playing and the like by those who wish to participate in a "friendly" game conducted at home. It is against those
who operate commercial gambling activities, who provide the
facilities through which others may gamble, who fix the odds to
line their own pockets, that these remarks are addressed. Their
profit has been shown to be enormous. It is that profit which, it is
proposed, should be taxed out of existence, for there lies the evil
and the danger to the national welfare.
One further limitation should be noted before turning to an
investigation of controlling law. The frustrations which have
accompanied local efforts to suppress commercialized gambling,
the hampering restrictions which have surrounded even state-wide
attacks on an enterprise shown to be national in scope, are too
well-known to require comment. Their very existence dictates the
obvious conclusion that any adequate tax law would have to be
enacted at the national level. The experience of the past has
shown that if the criminal element in the community has indicated
any respect for the forces of law and order it has been because
of a wholesome fear of the power and integrity of the national
government, especially in connection with the taxation of income.
The federal agent, therefore, may prove to be the nemesis of the
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gambler, not because any power on the part of the national government to regulate gambling per se is involved, but because the
nation's tax laws may become concerned'

I. FEDERAL T~xATIoN @F ILLEGAL INCOME
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

There is a general belief that the Sixteenth Amendment to the
federal constitution constitutes the source of power in the federal
government to impose an income tax. Such is far from the case
for every government, including a federal one, has the inherent
power to impose a tax for its support, quite without limit as to
the nature of such tax so long as the same does not violate express
constitutional restriction. An income tax is included within such
power, hence the power to levy an income tax has been enjoyed by
the federal government since its formation. Recognition of the
necessity for the existence of such power on the part of the federal
government was accorded by the framers of the Constitution when
they wrote in Section 8 of Article 1, acknowledging that Congress
should have
Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.
a Save as to the District of Columbia, the territories, the insular possessions, the
Indian lands, and its own establishments, the national government is generally
without power to prohibit conduct otherwise criminal unless as an incident to the
exercise of some one or more of the express powers delegated to it by the United
States Constitution. In that regard, the recent history concerning successful prosecutions of violators of federal laws passed in aid of the taxing power is well known.
In the Northern District of Illinois alone, federal convictions have been obtained
against such notorious characters as Alphonse Capone, Case No. 19179; Ralph
Capone, Cases No. 20566 to 20569 inclusive; Jake Guzik, Case No. 32227; Sam
Guzik, Case No. 22081; Frank Nitti, No. 21239; Murry L. Humphries, Case No.
27428; Moe Annenberg, et al., Cases 31755, 31760 to 31762, and 31765 to 31767,
inclusive; Louis Lipschultz, Case No. 17276; Hyman Levin, Cases No. 32202 and
27954; Rocco DeGrazzia, Cases No. 46-CR-229, 28252, and 27954; Nick DeGrazzia,
Cases No. 28250 and 27955; Edward Jones, Cases No. 48-CR-205, 45-CR-30, 31562
and 33153; Stewart S. Brown, Case No. 32168, 32154 to 32156 Inclusive; Jack
Sommers, Cases No. 27087, 28023, 32168, and 32154; James Hartigan, Cases 32168
and 32155; William P. Kelly, Cases No. 32156, 32168, and 32766; and William
Malosky, Case No. 31760, In addition thereto, see also United States v. Johnson,
319 U. S. 503, 63 S. Ct. 1233, 87 L. Ed. 1546 (1943); United States v. Skidmore,
123 F. (2d) 604 (1941), cert. den. 315 U. S. 800, 62 S. Ct. 626, 86 L. Ed. 1201 (1942);
and United States v. Potson, 171 F. (2d) 495 (1948).
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The breadth of the phrase "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises" is such that it covers every form of taxation which
could conceivably be devised, 4 necessarily including an income tax.
In the case of the federal government, however, the purpose must
be either (a) to pay the debts, (b) provide for the common defence,
or (c) provide for the general welfare of the United States. 5
Courts will not, generally, inquire into the congressional purpose
evidenced by the enactment of a tax measure, hence if Congress
should choose to enact a tax measure directed against illegal income it should withstand attack from that angle.6
One limitation was imposed originally on the federal power to
tax and that was one which required that all duties, imposts, and
excises should be uniform throughout the United States and that
direct taxes should be apportioned among the states in proportion
to population as determined by a census. 7 Income taxes imposed
during the Civil War period" may have been justified under the
emergency conditions then existing, but other attempts to collect
4 Cooley, Const. Lim., Carrington Ed., Vol. II, Ch. XIV, p. 986 et seq.

5 As to whether the power to tax was granted simply in order to make possible
the payment of debts, etc., or is a power separate and distinct from the other substantial powers to pay debts, to provide for the common defence, and to provide for
the general welfare, see Story, Comm., Vol. 1, § 907-9, and Murphy, "Memorandum
on the General Welfare Clause," Sen. Doc. No. 46, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-3.
See also United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477, 102 A. L. R.
914 (1936).
6In Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U. S. (4 Pet.) 514 at 563, 7 L. Ed. 939 at 956
(1830), Chief Justice Marshall stated: "The power of legislation, and consequently
of taxation, operates on all persons and property belonging to the body politic ...
This vital power may be abused; but the interest, wisdom and justice of the representative body, and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security."
The same judge, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 at 430, 4 L. Ed.
579 at 607 (1819), said that It was "unfit for the judicial department to inquire
what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the
abuse, of the power." In McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49
L. Ed. 78 (1904), a case concerning the validity of a heavy tax on oleomargarine,
the Supreme Court held that since the statute was primarily a revenue measure the
judicial department could not inquire into the ultimate effect of the statute or the
motives of its enacters. But see Waite, "May Congress Levy Money Exactions,
Desileated 'Taxes,' Solely for the Purpose of Destruction," 6 Mich. L. Rev. 277
(1908).
7 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9(4).
8 See Act of July 1, 1862, and historical note, 26 U. S. C. A. pp. 3-4, as well as
discussion in Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Note also
Co., 157 U. S. 429 at 573, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 at 816 (1895).
Chief Justice Taney's letter, under date of March 10, 1863, to the Secretary of the
Treasury, printed as an appendix in 157 U. S. 715, 39 L. Ed. 1155.
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income taxes at the national level 9 fell because of this requirement
for apportionment. It was the office of the Sixteenth Amendment,
therefore, to remove the apportionment requirement as it related
to income taxation, so as to permit the collection of varying sums
from the citizens of the different states based upon the location
and size of the wealth being taxed rather than the relative size of
the population. That amendment, as is well known, declares that
Congress shall have "power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States and without regard to any census or enumeration."I
Under it, Congress has, from time to time, passed and amended
income tax laws to the point where, in direct opposition to any
principle of uniformity, there is now a wide variety of shading
not only in terms of the rate of taxation but also between kinds
of taxpayers.' 0
The power of Congress to enact laws taxing income having
become acknowledged, only one point of inquiry from the constitutional standpoint might remain and that is whether or not
Congress is limited to the taxation of lawful income only, so as to
oppose constitutional objection to a tax law designed to reach
illegal income. There should be no need to belabor the fact that
the Sixteenth Amendment, by its very language, grants power to
tax incomes "from whatever source derived." The taxing power
being thereby made without limit, no court would sustain an objection that only lawful incomes come within reach of the tax
collector if Congress should see fit to exercise the power conferred
upon it. The constitutional foundation being secure, it is next
necessary to turn to see to what extent Congress has already
determined to utilize the power it possesses.
9 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759
(1895).
10 The differentiation between individuals and artificial persons, such as corporations, Is sound in law. The intense division of artificial persons Into many subclasses for purpose of taxation or exemption Is controlled more nearly by economic
rather than legal reasons.
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At the time Congress enacted the Income Tax Act of October
3, 1913, it chose to impose the tax on net incomes from
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal services, of whatever kind, and in
whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or
use of or interest in real or personal property, or from the
interest, rents, dividends, securities or the transaction of any
lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatsoever."
There was room for argument, under that statute, that the final
phrase was modified by the earlier reference to "lawful" business,
so as not to subject illegal occupations to taxation.
When, however, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, it took the entire quoted provision into the new law
with an only, but highly significant, change which consisted of
omitting the word ''lawful" before the word "business," so that
the final clause read "interest, rents, dividends, securities or the
transaction of any business carried on for gains or profits, and
income derived from any source whatever." 12 The new law made
evident the intention of Congress to include, as taxable gain, the
profits and income from any unlawful as well as from any lawful
source. As so amended, the provision has been carried forward
into every subsequent revenue act including the one presently in
force.' 8
Two noteworthy points must be made as to the scope of the
existing tax law. While Congress has shown a disposition to tax
even illegal income, it has placed the tax burden on "net income,"
as defined, and has seen fit to 1require that the business be carried
on "for gains or profits." Each of these concepts will be exam11 38 Stat. 166, § 2(b) ; Mason's U. S. Code Anno., 1926, Vol. 2, pp. 1675-6.
1240 Stat. 1057, § 213(a) ; Mason's U. S. Code Anno., 1926, Vol. 2, p. 1750. Italics
added.
1326 U. S. C. § 22(a).
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ined later, but before doing so it would be proper to see what
action has been taken by the courts with regard to construing the
statute as it applies to income or funds received from illegal
sources.
B.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES

There have been periods of substantial uncertainty in this
country, even after the enactment of the section of the 1916 Act
quoted above, as to whether gains from illegal transactions were
to be classed as "income" within the statutory definition and were
to be subjected to taxation. Lower federal courts, for example,
were not in agreement, during the prohibition period, as to
whether gains from transactions in violation of the Volstead Act
were to be treated as taxable income. All such doubts were resolved in favor of taxation, however, in the opinion written by
Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of United States v. Svllivan.14 The
defendant there concerned, charged with a criminal failure to
report and pay a tax on his income from illegal liquor activities,
had questioned his conviction on the ground such income was
non-taxable. The Circuit Court of Appeals had held in favor of
taxation under the 1916 provision, but had reversed the conviction
on the ground that to compel Sullivan to file a return would mean
forcing him to disclose evidence of his commission of a federal
crime, hence lead to a violation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. 15 More will be said about this point later,
but on the question of the right to tax, Judge Soper had remarked,
over an argument that Congress could not have intended to put
legitimate and illegitimate transactions on the same footing, that
strong reasons of public policy require that the gains of commercial dealings, which are also criminal, should be regarded
as beneath the contempt of the law for the purposes of taxation. The inconsistency of the government in prohibiting an
14 274 U. S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 (1927).
15 U. S. Const., Amend. V.
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act, and at the same time subjecting it to taxation for purposes of revenue, is obvious. 6
Mr. Justice Holmes, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals and
reinstating the conviction, saw no such inconsistency. Speaking
for the entire court, he could see no reason to doubt the interpretation given to the statute nor "any reason why the fact that
a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying the taxes
7
that if lawful it would have to pay."
Subsequent to that decision, and prior to a development about
to be mentioned, many cases have supported the proposition that
the statute, as it now stands, justifies the taxation of unlawful
gains derived from such illegitimate activities as the illicit traffic
in liquor,"' race track bookmaking, 19 card playing, 2° unlawful insurance policies, 21 illegal prize fight pictures, 2 2 lotteries, 2 3 graft, 24
25
fraudulent misapplication of a client's funds by an attorney,
and the payment of protection money or ransom to racketeers and
kidnappers. 2
On the basis thereof, one would be inelined to
conclude that the receipts from illegal syndicated gambling would
likewise be subjected to taxation, and the purported proprietor of
certain gambling establishments was, in United States v. Johnson,27 ordered to jail for wilful failure to report the income derived therefrom. The salutary lesson of the Capone conviction
calls for no comment whatever.
Notwithstanding the line of decisions just mentioned, and
F. (2d) 809 at 810 (1926).
274 U. S. 259 at 263, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 at 1039 (1927).
18 Maddas v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 572 (1939), affirmed in 114 F. (2d) 548
(1940) ; Poznak v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 727 (1928).
19 McKenna's Appeal, 1 B. T. A. 326 (1925).
20 Weiner v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 905 (1928).
21 Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (1937).
22 Richard v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 316 (1929).
23 Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 829 (1937) ; Huntington v. Commissioner,
35 B. T. A. 835 (1937) ; Voyer v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 1192 (1926).
24 Chadick v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 961 (1935).
25 United States v. Wampler, 5 F. Supp. 796 (1934).
26 Humphrey v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 857 (1940), affirmed in 125 F. (2d)
340 (1942).
27319 U. S. 503, 63 S. Ct. 1233, 87 L. Ed. 1546 (1943), rehearing den. 320 U. S.
808, 64 S. Ct. 25, 88 L. Ed. 488 (1943).
1615
17
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the administrative interpretation which had been given to the
statute in question,2 8 the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Wilcox 9 has tended to throw the question of taxing illegal receipts into a new stage of doubt. The
sole question there was whether or not money obtained by embezzlement constituted taxable income to the embezzler. It was
alleged that the money embezzled had been lost in the gambling
houses in Reno. The embezzler had been convicted for his crime
against the state and had been sentenced to the state penitentiary. The victim, however, had never condoned or forgiven the
taking of the money, up to the date of the tax case, and still looked
to the embezzler to restore the funds taken. The Supreme Court,
recognizing a conflict between the Circuit Courts of Appeal on
the matter of the taxability of embezzled money, took jurisdiction. A majority of the court held, under an opinion written by
the late Mr. Justice Murphy, that the presence of a taxable gain
was conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim of right to the
alleged gain, and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional
obligation to repay or return that which would otherwise constitute a gain.
Recognizing that there has never been, and probably never
will be, a totally satisfactory definition of "income," Mr. Justice
Murphy stated:
The very essence of taxable income, as that concept is used
in Section 22(a), is the accrual of some gain, profit or benefit to the taxpayer. This requirement of gain, of course,
must be read in its statutory context. Not every benefit received by a taxpayer from his labor or investment necessarily renders him taxable. Nor is mere dominion over
money or property decisive in all cases. In fact, no single,
conclusive criterion has yet been found to determine in all
situations what is sufficient gain to support the imposition
of an income tax. No more can be said in general than that
28G. 0. M. 16572 XV-1, Cur. Bull. (1936), p. 82.

29327 U. S. 404, 66 S. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. 752 (1946).
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all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered . . .
Moral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability. The question, rather, is whether the taxpayer in fact received a statutory gain, profit or benefit. That the taxpayer's motive
may be reprehensible or the mode of receipt illegal has no
bearing on the applicability of Section 22(a) .3
Inasmuch as the particular taxpayer had not obtained the money
under any semblance of a bona fide claim of right and was still
regarded to be under a duty and obligation to repay, he was held
not to have received any taxable income by reason of his embezzlement. Some clue may be provided, however, by the court's remark
that the employer was entitled "to replevin the money as soon
as it was appropriated or to have it summarily restored by the
magistrate," together with the fact that the "debtor-creditor
relationship was definite and unconditional." 3 1
Accepting the premise that the mere fact that a business is
unlawful provides no exemption from tax liability, the question
then becomes one as to whether or not there is a difference between
money lost to an embezzler and money lost at gaming, in order
to make gambling receipts taxable to the gambler. The question
may be a fine one made to turn on the title to the money used in
the gambling transaction. It is, to say the least, doubtful that
the bookmaker or slot-machine operator can be said to have a
"claim of right" in the nature of a superior title to that of the
loser of the money lost. True, in the absence of a statute permitting suit or proof that the gamble was fradulent in character
so that the patron could never win,32 the general doctrine of the
law would permit the successful gambler to retain his winnings
against any attempt to recover the same on a quasi-contractual
theory because the parties would be treated as being in pari
delicto.3 3 But denial of a remedy to one does not necessarily
30 327 U. S. 404 at 407-8, 66 S. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. 752 at 755.

31 327 U. S. 404 at 409, 66 S. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. 752 at 756.
32 Watts v. Malatesta, 262, N. Y. 80, 186 N. E. 210, 88 A. L. R. 1072 (1933) ; Webb
v. Fulchire, 25 N. C. 485, 40 Am. Dec. 419 (1843).
-33 Howson v. Hancock, 8 T. R. 575, 101 Eng. Rep. 1555 (1800).
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prove that the other has acquired title, for at least one slotmachine operator has been denied the right to bring proceedings
to recover the machine, or its contents, despite an unlawful seizure
thereof.34 The machine not being property entitled to protection
before the law, can there be doubt of the positive legal right of the
patron who has deposited a sum of money in such a device to
grab an ax or a crowbar and pry the "bandit" apart for the
purpose of retrieving at least his own funds? Only if the loser
is willing to let the matter at rest could it be said that the operator
of the gambling device or gambling establishment has any claim
of right to the monellost.
Even so, the Wilcox case adds the requirement that there
shall be the absence of a definite, unconditional "obligation to
repay or return" that which would otherwise constitute a gain.
Under state statutes, with perhaps the exception in Nevada, the
loser is given an uninhibited right to bring suit for the repayment of the money lost in gambling. 5 If the loser should fail to
take action within a given period8 6 most statutes permit any third
person to bring a qui tam action, frequently with a view to compelling payment of a much larger sum as by way of treble damages, for the benefit of himself and the government. Until all
such proceedings are barred by limitation of time,8' it might
be said that the gambler has not yet achieved a status with
respect to the money won that it could be considered taxable
income in his hands. What response a court might make to such
arguments could not presently be predicted, for one is never
certain what the United States Supreme Court will do until it
34 Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 112, 74 N. E. (2d)

noted in 26

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw

29 (1947),

31.

35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 330, is typical.

The Illinois period is six months. See Holmes v. Brickey, 335 Ill. App. 390, 82
N. E. (2d) 200 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 181 for the manner
of calculating the period of limitation.
37 The stranger would appear to have up to five years in which to sue under Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16. By a process of reverse reasoning from the fact
that a bad debt is not considered deductible, absent proof to the contrary, except in
the tax year in which it becomes outlawed, it would seem the gambler might be
able to argue that there is no truly taxable receipt by him until all opportunity to
compel restoration has become barred by the lapse of time. But see Estate of
Joseph Nitto, 13 T. C. 858 (1949), at p. 866, for the view that the illegally obtained
money is taxable at the time of first receipt.
36
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has acted. 8 As the Wilcox case, and its possible applications, may
seem to be a weak spot in the attempt to tax illegal gambling and
other illegal activities out of existence, there would seem to be
some occasion to consider a modification of the tax laws in this
respect to remove all thought that there must be a claim of right
in the recipient before the illegal receipt should become taxable.
Such amendment could also provide clarification regarding any
technical problem growing out of the attempted passage of title
to the money lost.
One thing is certain and that is the court has been perfectly
willing, in clearly lawful transactions, to charge the burden of
taxation to persons obviously not entitled to assert any claim of
right to the fund under the state lawA9 The settlor of more than
one valid trust, the transferor of more than one share in a partnership, has been compelled to bear the impact of taxation on
funds which have never passed through his hands. There should,
then, be no hesitancy of achieving the same result against the
operator of an illegal business, especially since he at least handles
the money involved. Such money should also be taxed at applicable income tax rates rather than, as would seem to be the Treasury position,40 treated as some form of gift 4' bearing a rate far
lower than that applied to honest income.
An interesting consequence of the Wilcox
to be reflected in the effort made by certain
lish themselves to be embezzlers in order
munity, 42 and the argument has even been

decision would seem
taxpayers to estabto achieve tax imcarried over in an

38 Even the Supreme Court, as evidenced by the frequent divisions which have
occurred therein at the time of the decision of many recent cases, would seem to
be uncertain as to the state of the law.
39 Bartlett, "The Impact of State Law on Federal Income Taxation," 25 CHICAGOKENT LAw REviEw 103 (1947), particularly pp. 113-121.
40 G. C. M. 24945, Cum. Bull. 1946, p. 27, indicates that if the owner "condones the
taking of the property and forgives the indebtedness, taxable income may result...
depending upon the facts of the particular case."
41 As to whether a gratuitous cancellation of indebtedness results in a gift, hence
is taxable under gift-tax rates rather than exposed to an income tax, see Helvering
v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 at 331, 63 S. Ct. 577, 87 L. Ed. 785 at 791
(1943).
42 United States v. Currier Lumber Co., 70 F. Supp. 219 (1947); Wallace H.
Petit, 10 T. C. 1253 (1948).
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effort to protect the proceeds of an extortion from taxation. Following the indictment and conviction of Browne, Bioff, Nitti and
others for extorting money from the motion picture industry, an
effort was made to assess additional income taxes against the
estate of one of the deceased defendants. Opposition thereto
based on the Wilcox case was answered by the Tax Court, in the
proceeding entitled Estate of Joseph Nitto,43 when it pointed to
a possible distinction for use in matters of the kind under consideration. It said that, in the Wilcox case, the funds
were misappropriated without the knowledge or participation
of the owner, and, also, the funds came to the party who was
sought to be taxed not by the "conscious act" of the owner
"in response to a claim for an agreed service by the party
to whom they were paid." The Wilcox case does not stand
for the proposition that all funds "fraudulently or illegally
acquired" are non-taxable. . . . Even if we were to adopt
petitioner's suggestion and denominate these various receipts
as "extortion, "the result would not be otherwise. Although
the payors might have had the right to recover the funds
so paid over, at least until such recovery, imposition of an
income tax on the payees would not be improper. 44
The matter went no farther than the Tax Court, but it would be
interesting to speculate on what the result would have been had it
reached the Court of Appeals. If Nitti and his associates obtained
the money through a legally defined extortion, they got no more
title than did the embezzler in the Wilcox case. True the money
was handed over by those who had "knowledge" and who "participated" in the physical transfer, but is not the same thing true
of the victim of a holdup who acts at the point of a gun? May
not much the same thing be said of the participant in a gambling
transaction, although he may be separated from his money in a
much more subtle fashion?
4313 T. C. 858 (1949).

in the Chicago area.
44 13 T. C. 858 at 866.

The decedent was more familiarly known as Joseph Nitti
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NECESSITY

FOR UNIFORMITY

IN

TAXATION.

Supposing, for the moment, that it has been satisfactorily
established that it would be proper for Congress to legislate for
the imposition of an income tax on the proceeds received from
illegal transactions such as gambling, it is next necessary to consider whether any such tax law must operate with geographic
uniformity throughout the country upon all who engage in the
illegal activity and whether or not it is necessary to impose the
same rate on such persons as is imposed on honest taxpayers. If
gambling were the subject of condemnation in every state in the
union, as it is in most, there would be no problem as to geographic uniformity in the law. It is a fact, however, that some
states, particularly Nevada, treat gambling as a legitimate enterprise, but such fact would not make Congressional action unconstitutional as a violation of due process requirements. It frequently happens that there is a difference in law between the state
view on a subject and the attitude displayed in connection with
federal taxing statutes. 45 The Supreme Court itself has noted,
in the case of Phillips v. Commissioner,46 that the "extent and
incidence of federal taxes not infrequently are affected by differences in state laws; but such variations do not infringe the constitutional prohibition against delegation of the taxing power or
the requirement of geographical uniformity. ' 47 If further evidence is needed of the right of Congress to enact tax laws which
will have varying effect around the country, reference might be
made to the decisions in Florida v. Mellon4" and Poe v. San45 See Bartlett, "The Impact of State Law on Federal Income Taxation," 25
103 (1947).
46283 U. S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289 (1931).
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47 283 U. S. 589 at 602, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289 at 1300.
48273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265, 71 L. Ed. 511 (1927). The state there sought to
enjoin the defendants from attempting to collect an estate tax under Section 301 of
the Revenue Act of 1926 on the ground of discrimination in that, there being no
state inheritance tax in Florida nor even the possibility of one in view of the state
constitution, its citizens had to bear the full brunt of the federal estate tax since
they could not have the benefit of the credit, running up to 80% of the normal
estate tax, allowed for inheritance taxes paid to a state government. The statute
was held constitutional, despite the seeming discrimination, because Congress did
not have to "accommodate its legislation to the conflicting or dissimilar laws of the
several states nor control the diverse conditions to be found in the various states
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born.4 9 If Congress should feel that recognition should be accorded to the fact that gambling may be a lawful activity in
some areas, it could do so by discrimination in the matter of tax
rate, assessing the lawful gambling income at the same rates as
apply to other lawful income but subjecting the illegal income to
an accelerated rate, or by making allowance for the deduction of
lawful expenditures necessary for the production of such lawful
income while disallowing such expenditures in other cases.
Obviously, if some form of taxation is to be designed to remove the profit factor from illegal activities, with intent thereby
to destroy the same, the tax rate structure must be designed to
impose confiscatory levies upon the receipt of illegal income while
permitting legitimate enterprises to bear no more than a normal
burden. To increase the income tax rate to the point where it
would absorb 100% of the entire income of the country would be
disastrous to a capitalistic economy. Is there, however, any constitutional objection to the utilization of a tax schedule which
bears in unequal fashion upon different persons in the community? One need but refer to present income tax laws to see
that no legal objection exists, for artificial persons are subjected
to different rates than apply to humans, while higher rates apply,
in accelerated fashion, to wealthier humans than is true of others.
At present, income from illegal activity is treated ratewise
on the same basis as legitimate gains; in fact, even enjoys privileges not accorded to honest business men, as will be noted hereafter. It is an anomaly of strange hue that a legitimate business,
if corporate in form, should be called upon to pay normal taxes,
which necessarily work unlike results from the enforcement of the same tax." All
that was required was that the law should be uniform "in the sense that by its
provisions, the rule of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States."
See 273 U. S. 12 at 17, 47 S. Ct. 265, 71 L. Ed. 511 at 515.
49 282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58, 75 L. Ed. 239 (1930). The case turned on the right
of a marital community, residing in a state where community property doctrines
prevailed, to divide the income for tax purposes so as to enjoy a lower tax rate
than would be applicable if the same amount of income had been earned by a
husband alone In a common law state. The division, including the resultant tax
saving, was held proper on the basis of controlling state law, thereby leading to a
discrimination in favor of married taxpayers in community property states not
enjoyed by married taxpayers in other parts of the country. The discrimination
continued until Congress adopted the present equalizing provision, 26 U. S. C. § 301,
one which disregards state law on the point for income tax purposes.
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surtaxes, and excess profits taxes, while the commercialized
gambling syndicate, financially more bloated than many a corporation, enjoys relief from an excess profits tax although the very
conditions which justify or require such a program create the
climate in which rackets can flourish on the excess of money in the
hands of individuals. Other gross inequalities exist, but, concentrating on the question of the power of Congress to adopt
varying tax classifications, even at the expense of inequality in
taxation, it is clear that such a program would find no opposition
in law.
In Barclay & Company v. Edwards,50 for example, a domestic
corporation claimed a refund on taxes which it had paid out of
income derived from the manufacture of goods in the United
States but which it had sold abroad. A foreign corporation, under
similar circumstances, would have been immune from taxation
on such operations. The Supreme Court answered the claim that
the law was invalid, because arbitrary and capricious in character,
by denying a right to refund. It said the "power of Congress
in levying taxes is very wide, and where a classification is made
of taxpayers that is reasonable, and not merely arbitrary and
capricious, the Fifth Amendment cannot apply.",' In the earlier
case of Evans v. Gore,12 the same court had noted that the taxing
power of Congress could be applied to "every object within its
range in such measure as Congress may determine" and enabled
that body "to select one calling and omit another, to tax one class
of property and to forbear to tax another," so that it might be
applied "in different ways to different objects so long as there
is geographical uniformity in duties, imposts and excises imposed.'' S There could, then, hardly be room for complaint of
arbitrary or capricious action if Congress should decide to divide
taxpayers into distinct categories on the basis of the legality or
illegality of their activities, or to direct the application of one rate
50 267 U.

S. 442, 45 S. Ct. 348, 69 L. Ed. 703 (1924).

51267 U. S. 442 at 450, 45 S. Ct. 348, 69 L. Ed. 703 at 706.
52253 U. S. 245, 40 S. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887 (1920).
53 253 U.

S.245 at 256, 40 S. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887 at 893.
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to legitimate income and another, and still higher, rate to illegal
gains.
On the question of how great a differential in rate could be
drawn between the two classes of taxpayers, the answer again
would seem to rest on the basis that the power resides in the
hands of Congress and its determination would not be open to
judicial scrutiny. To this point, of course, there has been no decision acknowledging the power of Congress to fix a tax rate from
the standpoint of the legality or illegality of the occupation engaged in. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the probable response the courts would make to a claim of unconstitutionality. A state statute imposing a tax on margarine, not applicable to the sellers of butter, was upheld in A. Magnano Company
v. Hamilton.54 The United States Supreme Court there stated:
Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law
clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation
upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. . . . And no reason exists for applying a different
rule against a state in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Collateral purposes or motives of a legislature in
levying a tax of a kind within the reach of its lawful power
are matters beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. Nor may
a tax within the lawful power of a state be judicially stricken
down under the due process clause simply because its enforcement may or will result in restricting or even destroying
55
particular occupations or businesses.
Again, in the case of Alaska Fish Salting & By-products Company
v. Smith,5" it said that even if the tax "should destroy a business,
it would not be made invalid or require compensation on that
ground alone. Those who enter upon a business take that risk."
The court further stated it knew of "no objection to exacting a
discouraging rate as the alternative to giving up a business, when
the legislature has the full power of taxation." 57
54 292 U.
55 292 U.
56255 U.
57 255 U.

S.
S.
S.
S.

40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934).
40 at 44, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 at 1114.
44, 41 S. Ct. 219, 65 L. Ed. 489 (1921).
44 at 48-9, 41 S. Ct. 219, 65 L. Ed. 489 at 495.

Italics added.
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Two other illustrations may shed light on the point. The
validity of the Silver Purchase Act of June 19, 1934, one imposing
a tax equal to fifty per cent. of the gains resulting from transactions in that metal, was sustained in the case of United States v.
Hudson 5 despite the fact that the taxpayer had a net loss on his
over-all operations for the year. Even more confiscatory, but
equally valid, was the eighty per cent. excise tax imposed by the
Unjust Enrichment Act, 59 a law enacted to meet the situation
which had arisen because of the declared invalidity of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.6 0 The government there appropriated
practically all of the gains arising from a collection of the tax
from the consumer without a corresponding payment thereof into
the federal treasury, and its action was upheld.6 ' In one case
involving the application of that statute, the court declared that
if Congress
believes that a profit from a particular source, in the production of which the community has participated, was obtained under such circumstances as to amount to "unjust
enrichment" by the standards of social or business conduct,
as it conceives them, and taxes it heavily, courts have no
right to say "nay."
And this is true even if the taxing period were not limited, but the tax was continuous, aiming to
tax a particular source, product or business out of existence.

62

One is forced to the conclusion, therefore, that Congress has
unquestionable power to enact an income tax law containing
stringent provisions directed against illegal gains derived from
such things as gambling and to fix rates at a point where, from
58 299 U. S. 498, 57 S. Ct. 309, 81 L. Ed. 370 (1937).
59 49 Stat. 1648, Revenue Act of June 22, 1936, Tit. III, § 501, now 26 U. S. C.

700.
60 7 U. S. C. A. § 601 set seq. The statute had been declared unconstitutional in
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477, 102 A. L. R. 914
(1936).
61 Wilson Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 138. F. (2d) 249 (1944), cert. den. 320
U. S. 800, 64 S. Ct. 430, 88 L. Ed. 483 (1944) ; Union Packing Co. v' Rogan, 17 F.
Supp. 934 (1937).
62 Union Packing Co. v. Rogan, 17 F. Supp. 934 at 940 (1937).
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a nullification of private profit, the illegal activity would soon
cease. Being outside the pale of law, persons so taxed would find
no protection within legal limitations designed to safeguard honest
men and honest businesses. Such a program would, of course,
require action by Congress to provide the necessary rate schedule.
If it should be of the opinion that the step would be desirable, the
machinery is already set up to accomplish the indicated purpose.
II.

TAX ADMINISTRATION
A.

AND ENFORCFMBNT

PBESENT VIEWS ON ADMINISTraTION.

The addition of still another law to the statute book, already
crowded with measures intended to protect the community from
crime, would be a meaningless gesture if no effort was made to
compel obedience to its terms. Mention has already been made
of the fearful respect accorded by the underworld toward the
income tax law. The shadow of the federal agent has been enough
to induce all but the hardiest of malefactors to pay at least a
part of their ill-gotten wealth into the public treasury. If the tax
rate should be set at a level where the entire profit is to be
channeled into the public coffer, it is only to be expected that more
will be encouraged to attempt to evade the law in order to save
something for themselves. Only by stern enforcement, aided by
the upper and nether millstones of tax collection and criminal
punishment, would such a program become effective. Fortunately, the number who will be so tempted will come nowhere
near the portion of the population which was led to flout the
prohibition laws and bring law enforcement into disrespect. Adequately staffed with men of sufficient determination, the Treasury
Department should be able to drive home the lesson that organized
crime does not pay, either with freedom or dollars.
Is there anything in present tax administration or law which
would militate against such a program? Policies currently followed by the Internal Revenue Department are, in some respects,
weighted to favor the criminal class at the expense of honest
men. Mention has been made of the fact that syndicate income
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bears none of the burden of the excess profits tax. A disposition
to put the receipts from crime in the category of gifts, taxed at
a lower level that honest profits, has also been noted.6 3 Gross
inequalities in the matter of enforcement of the requirement for
the keeping of records and reporting of gains and of other financial details6 4 might also be mentioned. The gambling racket is
possibly the largest industry, from the standpoint of volume of
business, rapidity of turnover, and magnitude of profit, presently
operating in the United States, yet it is permitted to exist without keeping financial records, or at best the most meager of records, except such as it may have been successful in keeping to
itself. The Department has been content to accept returns, together with payment of the tax admitted to be due, totally lacking
in data from which to permit verification of the accuracy thereof.
Veiled reference to income from "speculation" or from "investments" is about as far as the record will bear. But the honest
taxpayer, from fear he may omit some trumpery dividend payment, is required to detail not only the name of each corporation
from which he received such a payment but also the address of
its office and the amount so received. 5 The corporate taxpayer,
or the individual engaged in operating a legitimate enterprise,
well knows the cost and labor of keeping the complete financial
records demanded of him, and the response of the Department if
such records are not letter perfect!

B.

ALLOWABILITY

OF DEDUCTIONS

Even more flagrant is the disposition toward the credit for
deductions taken in relation to the taxpayer's trade or business.
Inasmuch as the tax, at present, attaches to the "net income"
of the taxpayer, determination of that "net" requires that consideration be given to those items deducted from gross in ar63 See

notes 40 and 41, ante.
64 Reg. 111, § 29.41-3. See also Henderson, Introduction to Income Taxation (The
Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co., Rochester, 1949), 2d Ed., p. 449 et seq.
65 The Department yielded to the extent of permitting the taxpayer to omit the
address of the corporation if its shares were listed on a regular exchange.
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riving at the tax base. The honest taxpayer is required, in case
of doubt, to produce evidence that all such deductions are ordinary and necessary expenses having a direct relation to a trade
or business entered into and carried on for profit. Except where
otherwise specifically permitted, 6 no other deduction will be tolerated. A gain from the sale of the taxpayer's residence, for example, becomes taxable, but a loss cannot be deducted, except
as an offset to other capital gains, since the property was not
used in a trade or business nor acquired with a view toward making a profit. Cost of repair and depreciation on such a residence
may not be taken into account. Other illogical results flow from
still other ill-conceived provisions in the statute.
In contrast, the Department appears to allow to the operator
of an illegal business a deduction for all those expenses which
have been made "in the actual production of income. "67 The commercialized gambler could hardly argue that his occupation is
not one entered into for the sake of "gains or profits." No court
would accept the reasoning that each triansaction should be classed
as a separate investment undertaken for a capital gain, as might
be the case of the occasional speculator in corporate stocks and
bonds, hence no deduction should be permitted except on the
basis that the expenditure was an ordinary and necessary expense having a direct relation to his trade or business. But even
if the expenditure were of that character, it does not follow that
any credit should be allowed for the making thereof, for public
policy could well intervene and displace the logic applied to the
honest business man.
The Tax Court case of Stralla v. Commissioner0 8 is closely
in point for the present purpose. The taxpayer there was found
to be the real party in interest concerned with the operation of
66 Special statutory authority is necessary to permit the taxpayer to deduct certain non-recurrent expenses such as losses from fire, storm, casualty, and similar
items: 26 U. S. C. § 23.
67 See Stralla v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 801 at 821 (1947).
68 9 T. C. 801 (1947).
See also Lilly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 188 F.
(2d) 269 (1951), denying an optical company the right to deduct, as "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses, amounts paid to oculists by way of "kick-backs" on
business forwarded because opposed to public policy.
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a gambling boat stationed more than three miles from the California shore line but within the confines of Santa Monica Bay.
After much litigation, it had been held that the boat was anchored
within the jurisdiction of the state as it lay shoreward of a line
connecting the headlands which formed the bay. For this reason, the gambling operations carried on aboard the ship were
illegal because contrary to state law. Patrons of the gambling
ship, one large enough to accommodate as many as 2,000 at a
time, were ferried back and forth by water taxi. The taxpayer's
returns disclosed his business to be that of operator of a gambling ship and the contest developed over his right to deduct
certain outlays incurred in the conduct thereof. The expenses
fell into three categories: (1) fees paid to lawyers to defend the
enterprise against the charge the boat was anchored in state
waters, including money paid to a lobbyist with a view to influencing legislation; (2) penalties paid the state for operating
water taxis without a license; and (3) bad debt deductions based
on a loan made to a pier company used as a landward terminus.
Taxpayer contended these were ordinary and necessary expenses
and the fact that the enterprise was determined to be illegal was
a matter of no moment. The court, on the other hand, held that
the allowance of these deductions would "frustrate sharply defined national or state policy proscribing particular types of conduct," and were not made "in the actual production of the income" but more nearly for the purpose of perpetuating a violation of state law.6 9 There is a sound basis, therefore, for denying the operator of an illegal enterprise the right to claim any
deduction from his gross income under the guise of expenses,
whether ordinary and necessary or made in the actual production of income.
Calculation of the tax base also involves a problem with regard to the adjustment of losses on certain transactions entered
into for profit against the profits made on others. The honest
business man, quite properly, is permitted to take such losses
into account in the preparation of his annual profit and loss state699 T. C. 801 at 820.
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ment, for no one is so expert as to make a profit on every transaction. If the illegal gambling business were to be treated on the
same basis, it would be logical to allow the gambler to deduct
amounts paid on bets lost against the income received from bets
won. The holding in the Stralla case just mentioned would appear to militate against that idea, but the law is not too clear
on the subject. There was a time when losses on gambling were
deductible only if the transaction took place in a state where
gambling was legal.7 ° Under that doctrine, the typical commercialized gambler would be required to report, as net income, all
winnings without deduction for any losses. The Internal Revenue Act of 1934 made a change to the extent of permitting the
deduction of gambling losses, but only to the extent that gains
had been made from that source7 1 and then only if the losses
were incurred in connection with the taxpayer's trade or busi2
ness or bore a relation to transactions entered into for profit.7
It is quite likely that Congress had in mind the granting of relief to the patron of the gambling establishment rather than the
proprietor thereof, but one decision does indicate that the measure of relief is open to both.
In Humphrey v. Commissioner,3 the taxpayer had made
wagers on card games, on football games, and on horse races.
The wagering gains exceeded the amount of losses. The commissioner claimed a tax liability based on the gross gains without deduction of any losses incurred, but the court permitted deduction
of the losses although the taxpayer offered no proof that the
several wagers had been made with a view to profit. As the decision came subsequent to the 1934 act, it might be said to have
nullified one of the two provisos incorporated therein, to-wit:
the loss must have been incurred in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business or bear a relation to a transaction en70 Cronan v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 668 (1935) ; Appeal of Heide, 2 B. T. A.
451 (1925).

7126 U. S. C. § 23(h).
72 Ibid., § 23(e) (1)

and § 23(e) (2).

78162 F. (2d) 853 (1947).
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tered into for profit. 74 The holding did not pass without dissent,
for Judge Holmes was of the opinion that Section 23(e) of the
1934 Act was not intended to liberalize the allowance of deductions for wagering losses. In his belief, it was "intended to constitute an additional restriction upon their allowance," ' 5 hence
required the concurrence of both factors before deduction would
be proper.
Inasmuch as the gambler's conduct in paying off on bets lost
is more nearly intended to perpetuate a violation of state law,
it would seem that the frustration of "sharply defined national
and state policy proscribing particular types of conduct," referred to in the Stralla case, ought to be sufficient reason for
denying to the gambling racketeer the right to take any deduction, from the proceeds of the wagers he has won, on the basis
of losses on other transactions, just as should be the case with
respect to his other illegal expenditures. Put differently, taxation of the illegal enterprise on the basis of its gross gains without relief from any of the costs incident to its conduct would not
only insure the collection of the highest possible rate of tax but,
by financial attrition, would lead more rapidly to its collapse.
If present law, as interpreted, is inadequate to produce that result, Congress should consider the need for amendment at the
same time it ponders a change in the tax rates applicable to such
criminal operations.
C.

SUFFICIENCY OF PRESENT PENALTIES

Assuming, for the moment, that the tax plan, including the
details of its administration, was such that the illegal enterprise
was exposed to the obligation to pay the highest possible tax
on its operations without relief from any of the expenses of doing business and that it was required to keep adequate records
and file complete returns, what likelihood is there of compliance with such a law? No one would be so foolish as to suppose
that any tax law will be obeyed, no matter how light the burden,
7426 U. S.C. § 23(e).
75 162 F. (2d) 853 at 855.
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except as it is backed up by stern enforcement with adequate
penalty for its violation. Is the present income tax law satisfactory in that regard? Aside from provisions making it a crime
to file a return which the taxpayer does not believe to be true
and correct, 76 or to counsel another in the preparation and presentation of a false return,77 the principal criminal sanctions of
the law are directed against those who wilfully attempt to evade
or defeat the tax 78 or who wilfully fail to file returns. 79 Successful prosecutions in the past of those who endeavored to evade
the burden of the income tax, together with the visitation of heavy
penalties as well as ultimate collection of the tax due, 80 appear
to have taught underworld characters that it is the better part
of wisdom to file at least a perfunctory return and to pay the
tax admitted to be due. Five years in a federal penitentiary together with a stiff fine would seem to be adequate penalty for
the felony of tax evasion. Only the section which makes it a
misdemeanor punishable by a year in jail to wilfully fail to file
a return might need Congressional attention, if the penalty for
violation is to be severe enough to overcome the natural reticence
of the illegal gambler to report the scope of his operations and
to channel his ill-gotten gains into the public treasury.
D.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE

Is there a possibility, at this point, that the taxpayer, concerned by the necessity for making disclosure of the nature of
his operations, might be able to claim the privilege of the Fifth
Amendment against self-incrimination? Mention has previously
7626 U. S. C. § 3809(a).

77 Ibid., § 3793(b) (1).
78 Ibid., § 145(b).
79 Ibid., § 145 (a).

so The statute calls for the addition of a penalty, in fraud cases, equal to 50%
of the tax due, in addition to interest: 26 U. S. C. § 293(b). The Kefauver Committee is said to have adverted to the fact that certain settlements of tax liability connected with the extortion described in Estate of Joseph Nitto, 13 T. C. 858
(1949), illustrate but "another example of the efficiency of the underworld in
releasing its leaders from the toils of the law." A claim against Campagna and
Ricca for a total of $470,000 in taxes and penalties was settled for $190,000 as a
preliminary to establishment of eligibility for parole.
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been made of the holding in United States v. Sullivans1 on the
point of the right of the government to assess and collect a tax
against illegal income. That case is also important in relation to
the question of self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals had ordered a reversal of the conviction of Sullivan on a charge of wilful
failure to file returns on the ground that the compulsion of making
a return would force him to disclose the commission of a crime without providing for a corresponding immunity from prosecution. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court,
is most enlightening. He wrote:
As the defendant's income was taxed, the statute of course
required a return . . . In the decision that this was contrary to the Constitution, we are of opinion that the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far. If the
form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making, he could have raised the
objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide
what, if anything, he might have withheld. Most of the items
warranted no complaint. It would be an extreme, if not an
extravagant, application of the Fifth Amendment to say
that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his
income because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point, he should
have tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon.
He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter
by his own declaration that to write any word upon the gov82
ernment blank would bring him into danger of the law.
Applicable regulations, adopted pursuant to the statute, achieve
much the same result, 3 but the tolerant attitude of the Department is not easy to understand for the mere statement in a re81274 U. S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 (1927).
82 274 U. S. 259 at 263-4, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 at 1039-40.

"The privilege against incrimination in the
83 Reg. 111, § 29.145-1, declares:
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is not a defense to a charge of failure to
file a return, and does not authorize a refusal to state the amount of income,
though the taxpayer's income was made through crime."
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turn of the amount of taxpayer's income, with nothing more,
hardly amounts to a legally enforcible claim of privilege. More
nearly, it constitutes a waiver, for the privilege must be asserted
in affirmative fashion and at the first opportunity, i. e. on the face
of the return itself.
Suppose the taxpayer does, by appropriate means, assert the
claim of privilege. Does it follow that he is entitled to have his
claim respected? It is fundamental law that the protection afforded by the guarantee against self-incrimination is one designed to immunize the individual from prosecution at the hand
of the government which has compelled the disclosure. When
it is remembered that, generally, the ownership and operation of
slot machines, handbooks, gambling establishments and the like
do not involve any violation of federal law, where is the basis
for the claim of privilege against self-incrimination on the part
of such individuals?
The answer to that query is amply provided by language in
the opinion in the case of United States v. Murdock. 4 The taxpayer there concerned had filed income tax returns but had annually deducted a sum of money which he claimed he had paid
to others as a form of graft. He refused to answer the interrogation of federal agents, who sought particulars relating to the
claimed deduction, on the ground his answers might incriminate
and degrade him. Indicted for such refusal to answer, he filed a
special plea based on the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court
said:
The plea does not rest upon any claim that the inquiries were
being made to discover evidence of crime against state law.
Nothing of state concern was involved. The investigation
was under federal law in respect to federal matters. The
information sought was appropriate to enable the Bureau to
ascertain whether appellee had in fact made deductible payments in each year as stated in his return, and also to determine the tax liability of the recipients. Investigations for
84 284 U. S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 211 (1931).

TAXATION:

POTENTIAL DESTROYER

OF GRIME

federal purposes may not be prevented by matters depending upon state law . . . The English rule of evidence against
compulsory self-incrimination, on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of
another country . . . This court has held that immunity
against state prosecution is not essential to the validity of
federal statutes declaring that a witness shall not be excused
from giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate
him, and also that the lack of state power to give witnesses
protection against federal prosecution does not defeat a
state immunity statute. The principle established is that full
and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the
protection furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination . . . As appellee at the hearing did not invoke
protection against federal prosecution, his plea is without
merit and the government's demurrer should have been sustained. 5
If discovery of violation of state law should be the accidental
by-product of forcing compliance with regulations calling for detailed information relating to the income tax obligation, most persons would be inclined to say such result was all to the good. If
Congress thinks otherwise, it could provide protection against
state prosecution by ordering the suppression of information contained in tax returns. Some might incline in the direction of a
reward in the form of a lower rate in favor of all who keep complete records and file full returns, but with imposition of the
maximum rate on all who do not, in order to add the stimulus of
economic advantage.
E.

ESTABLISHING THE FACT OF VIOLATION

Faced with the potential impact of such a tax program, some
will undoubtedly be tempted to conceal their operations, neglect
85 284 U. S. 141 at 149, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 211 at 213.
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to maintain records, and omit the filing of returns in an effort to
hang on to illegal profits. The past has disclosed that enforcement machinery may operate slowly against such persons but, on
the federal scene at least, it has been thorough. Lacking direct
proof of violation, the government has been forced to resort to
circumstantial evidence taking a variety of forms. It has, for
example, used an analysis of the taxpayer's bank deposits, particularly if of periodic or recurrent character;80 stressed the excess of expenditures over admitted cash resources ;87 or relied on
unexplained increases in net worth 8 to support the claim of receipt of taxable income. On the basis thereof, or some combination of such forms of indirect proof, convictions for tax evasion
have been sustained against those who gleaned their wealth from
gambling,89 from "policy" or "numbers" games, 90 from the
selling of "protection" to handbooks, 91 or the operation of slotmachines. 9 2 There is no occasion to believe that federal agents
in the future would be less successful in their effort to uncover
tax frauds than they have been in the past. Any increase in the
number of violators which might be produced by the imposition
of even more stringent tax laws directed against the criminal element in the community could readily be offset by an increase in
the number of law enforcement officials.
An increase in tax rates is normally followed by an increase
86 Gleckman v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 394 (1935), cert. den. 297 U. S. 709, 56
S. Ct. 501, 80 L. Ed. 996 (1936).
87 Schuermann v. United States, 174 F. (2d) 397 (1949), cert. den. 338 U. S. 831,
70 S. Ct. 69, 94 L. Ed. 505 (1949). See also United States v. Potson, 171 F. (2d)
495 (1948).
88 United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. (2d) 488 (1949); Bryan v. United States,
175 F. (2d) 223 (1949).
89 United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503, 63 S. Ct. 1233, 87 L. Ed. 1546 (1943),
rehearing den. 320 U. S. 808, 64 S. Ct. 25, 88 L. Ed. 488 (1943) ; United States v.
Vassallo, 181 F. (2d) 1006 (1950); Lurding v. United States, 179 F. (2d) 419
(1950) ; Bryan v. United States, 175 F. (2d) 223 (1949), affirmed in 338 U. S. 552,
70 S. Ct. 317, 94 L. Ed. 335 (1950) ; United States v. Potson, 171 F. (2d) 495 (1948).
90 Schuermann v. United States, 174 F. (2d) 397 (1949), cert. den. 338 U. S. 831.
70 S. Ct. 69, 94 L. Ed. 505 (1949), rehearing den. 338 U. S. 881, 70 S. Ct. 156, 94 L.
Ed. 541 (1949).
91 United States v. Skidmore, 123 F. (2d) 604 (1941), cert. den. 315 U. S. 800.
62 S. Ct. 626, 86 L. Ed. 1201 (1942).
92 United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. (2d) 488 (1949).
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in the cost of products or services to the ultimate consumer, the
tax increase being absorbed in the selling or charging price. Fear
that heavy taxation on the criminal operator will be passed on
to the patron of his gambling enterprise should prove groundless. If, to compensate for his increased cost of operation, the
gambler should attempt to charge more for the illegal service he
purveys, as by lowering the odds or tightening up on the payoff on his devices, he will run into increased consumer resistance
as the element of chance becomes less and less attractive. Followed to its logical conclusion, such an impact of taxation could
well induce patrons to cease to gamble and deprive the operator
of any chance to profit. Conversely, if he endeavors to maintain
his rates in order to keep up the flow of dollars, a maximum tax
rate will still operate to drive him out of business for the profit will
migrate toward the public, rather than his private, treasury.
Caught in a mesh of tax laws kept firm by rigid enforcement, the commercial gambler would soon learn that crime cannot be made to pay and would cease his nefarious operations.
Until he does, the short-term by-product of increased revenue to
the national government should redound to the benefit of legitimate business and honest taxpayers. Congress, at least, should
consider the prospect as a chance to strike at the heart of commercialized crime.
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AS A LOCUS OF POWER

BEARDSLEY RUMVIL*

T

nII WORLD CRISIS of the twentieth century, which has had its
most recent violent manifestation in the Korean affair, springs
as we all know from ideological conflicts of the most profound
character. These conflicts pertain to the nature of the individual,
the nature of truth, and the question as to the existence of good
and evil. The fact of the crisis has caused the Western democracies to re-examine their political, social and economic institutions and in this re-examination many inconsistencies have been
found which are being gradually but definitely reconciled. One of
the areas of re-examination has been that of business enterprise
as it affects the dignity and freedom of the individual. In this
setting, this discussion is presented.
Business is one of the most pervasive facts of modern life.
Practically everybody who lives in a city, town, or village does
business with business several times a day, and practically everybody else has something to do with business many, many times
in every year. We depend on business for the things we eat
and wear, for the home we live in, for most of our amusements
and recreation, for going places and knowing what is going on
in the world. Most of us depend on business for the kind of
jobs we have. Many of us own some part of a business or receive some income from lending business our savings. Business
is so common that we take it for granted and use it without thinking much about it, just as we do any other familiar facility.
What is it that business does in our complicated modern
world? First, and primarily, it is the job of business to get things
ready for use. Second, in doing this work of production and distribution, business concurrently provides people with productive
* An address delivered at a joint luncheon of the Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law and the Section of Taxation, of the American Bar Association,
at Washington, D. C., September 19, 1950. Reprinted with permission from Proceedings of Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 1950, American
Bar Association, Chicago, pp. 67-77.
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activity-something useful to do-and a social setting in which
to do it. Third, and finally, business makes a place where the inevitable savings of the people can be put to work.
How does business do these things? A business does these
things by making rules, enforcing its rules when possible, and
compromising them when necessary.
It is in no sense a figure of speech to refer to a business company as a private government. A business is a government because within the law it is authorized and organized to make rules
for the conduct of its affairs. It is a private government because
the rules it makes within the law are final and not reviewable
by any public body. Some might say that the reason a business
is a private government is because it is owned by private individuals, but it seems to me that the existence of private authority is
more significant than the element of ownership. It is important
to note that this private government, the corporation, or business, existing through the authority of the public government, is
in no sense an interloper. On the contrary, it is the method we
have chosen by which to get done, for the welfare of all of us,
the work it is for private business to do.
A business carries on its operations through a multitude of
decisions under its own rules. The rules made by a business to
govern its operations must not be inconsistent with the law of
national, state, and local governments from which it derives its
authority and from which it receives protection. However, within the law, a business has great latitude in the rules it makes and
in their enforcement.

I.

THEB

GOVERNED

If business is private government, who are the governed?
We are the governed! We are governed by business in one or all
of four possible capacities: (1) as stockholder, (2) as vendor or
supplier, (3) as customer, or (4) as employee.
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THL STOCKHOLDER

Let us take these four capacities in which any of us may
stand in relation to business and examine them. In what sense
is the stockholder subject to the rule-making powers of the business in which he has placed his savings? One might have thought
that it would have been the other way around, that the stockholders, being the owners, would have the rule-making power instead
of being subjected to it. The stockholders collectively elect a
board of directors, and the board of directors elects a management. At the time of an election, the stockholders have the legal
right to change the directors and hence to change the managers.
They also have the right to vote on specific rules for the running
of the business that may have been proposed in a proxy statement. But, except at the time and place of a stockholders' meeting, the stockholders ordinarily have no rule-making power. A
large stockholder may have large influence on the rules that the
managers adopt. This influence may come as a result of the
power he may exercise at a later meeting of stockholders, or it
may be deference by the managers to a holder of property in the
business. A small stockholder also may have large influence if
his suggestions are helpful to the management. Access to management for the expression of ideas and criticism is frequently
available to the smallest stockholder.
The freedom of the company in taking actions affecting the
interests of stockholders is subject to legal limitations that experience has shown to be desirable, and the stockholder may go
to the courts to enforce his legal rights. But the enforcement
of legal rights is not the same thing as the power to make rules.
It is only the power of protection against illegal rules.
Under the private government of business, the stockholders
are definitely among the governed, even though they may choose
the boards of directors under whose authority the rules affecting
them are made. Their position is something like that of the citizens of the State of Illinois, or any other, who vote for the senators and representatives who pass the laws which they in turn obey.
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The laws regulating corporations are intended to give basic
protection to the stockholders against business rule-makers, just
as our constitutional rights are intended to protect us as citizens against the law-making and law-enforcing agencies of public
bodies-federal, state, and local. In addition to the laws, the
stockholder has a final safeguard against business rule-making
that he may find uncongenial-he may sell his stock. True, he
may not be able to sell his holdings for as much as he paid for
them. And, if he wants an income on his savings, he may become
a stockholder-citizen under another business government which
may please him little better or no better at all. Nevertheless, he
can free himself at a price if he wishes; he is not locked in. The
company he keeps, he keeps by choice.
B.

THE VENDORS

The second group among those governed under the rule-making of business are the vendors or suppliers of raw or semifinished materials, manufactured articles for resale, or services
of one kind or another, utilities, transportation, and the like. The
vendors are usually, but not always, other businesses which are
making rules of their own for the business which is to them a
customer.
The rules applying to vendors cover all the, specifications
made by the purchaser on the things that are purchased, the
price that will be paid, when it will be paid, the quantities, qualities, and nature of the things supplied, the date of delivery, provisions for return of damaged or unwanted goods, restrictions on
the sale to others, and all the rest. The contract or understanding in which these terms are embodied is like a treaty between
two sovereign states. In entering into such a business treaty,
both parties give up in some measure their freedom of subsequent action. They give it up because it is advantageous as compared with the alternative of making no arrangement at all.
Under ideal conditions, each business that is a party to a contract accedes willingly to the rules imposed by the other. Such
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conditions are met most fully when the vendor has some other independent company to whom he can sell his goods if he wishes,
and when Company X has another independent source from which
it can supply its needs. It is then possible to discuss terms in a
spirit of give-and-take, and to reach a compromise which, at
the moment of decision at any event, seemed the best choice among
real alternative possibilities.
Such equal conditions are not uncommon in the relations of
one business to another. Yet inequality of bargaining power will
always exist; when it is too great, imposed terms may be the
result. The use of force is just as ugly in establishing the rules
of a business contract as it is anywhere else. The coerced contract is of course resented in business, but it is not considered
a wrong business practice. Many businessmen, large and small,
welcome situations in which they are on the upper side of a business squeeze, and their resentment when they are on the lower
side is not taken too seriously by their colleagues who happen
to be spectators for the moment.
As a matter of fact, one test of survival efficiency in business
consists in not being subjected to coercion too frequently or too
severely at any one time. The last coerced act on a business is
the step just next to bankruptcy. The inefficient or unwanted
business cannot be protected from rule by force, because its own
nature determines that it shall be weak when another is strong.
C.

THE

CUSTOMERS

The third group of the governed are the customers. The
businesses which are customers of other businesses we have dealt
with in our consideration of vendors. Most customers, the tens
of millions of them, are individuals buying things and services
at retail. Superficially, the individual customer seems to be at
a great disadvantage in being subjected to the decisions of business management as to what he shall be offered, where and when
he can get it, and how much he will have to pay for it. The business management can make its rules and back them up with ad-
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ministrative organization, physical plant and equipment, money
in the bank, and propaganda.
But the inequality is not so great as it appears-in fact, the
strength may be with David Consumer if he does not have to
buy, or can postpone his buying, or can find something else that
will do, or some other place to get it. Then the imposing property and organization and resources of the Goliath Corporation
become clumsy handicaps before David's power of choice. The
company and its rule-making managers find themselves faced with
Idle plant
a debilitating condition called "idle plant expense."
expense will slowly but surely force the business rule-makers to
modify their rules to meet the views of the governed.
Does this mean that the customers make the rules? Not at
all. It only means that when the customers have the power of
choice, the rules that are made will be acceptable to them. Business management will still decide what will be offered and when
and where and for how much. Neither individually nor collectively
do customers have the ability to make rules or to enforce them.
But collectively the customers determine what rules shall in the
end survive.
The customer requires the aid of public government in order
to make his power of choice worth anything to him. This aid
takes the form of giving him the information he needs as to what
is available and at what price. Laws covering labeling, misbranding, and the like are all measures that strengthen the effectiveness
of customer choice. When there is no choice to the customer,
when a single company is the only source of supply, as is true
of telephone service or electricity or sometimes transportation,
the customer is helpless if the product or service is indispensable
for health and comfort. In these cases of natural or artificial
monopoly, the more important rules of the company affecting the
customer are regulated by public government.
D.

THE WORKERS

The fourth group of people governed by private business are
the employees, all of them. The president of the company, the
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vice-presidents, the deputies and assistants, the superintendents
and managers, foremen, bosses, and workers-male and female,
part-time and full-time, employed or unemployed-all are governed by the rule-making of private business. Some of these
governed are themselves subordinate rule-makers, promulgating
codes and issuing instructions with the authority of the businessstate by which they are employed. For most people, the rules
that most intimately affect their lives are made by their employers.
Most of the employed and of those who wish to be employed, but
are not, look to private business for employment. The rules affecting employment made by private business are therefore of
paramount importance to the individual. These rules determine
for the individual where he shall work, when he shall work,
what he shall do, who will give him orders, who will take orders
from him, his promotion and discipline, the amount he gets paid,
and the time and duration of his holidays and vacations.
The employees, all of them, are weak as compared with the
company that makes the rules and enforces them. To compensate
for this weakness, we must look to three off-setting balances.
The first is the labor laws of public government, the second is
the trade union or other private organization of employees, and the
third is the chance of getting a job working for some other company or of getting by without doing any work at all. But neither labor laws nor trade unions can do more than give the broad framework of conditions of employment and occasional protection to'
the individual in extreme cases of maladministration. Just as the
true strength of the customer in the apparently unequal negotiation with the business company was found in the ability of the
customer to go elsewhere to do his business, so too the strength
of the employee lies in his ability, when he has it, to get another
job from another employer or to get along without doing any
work. The laws and the unions may help provide a basic setting for private business rule-making, but they can never do
enough to give to the employee a real feeling that in conforming
to the rules affecting him he has exercised responsible free choice.
Even for the executive, the ability to get a job elsewhere and the

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

courage to do it are the only conditions under which subjection
to business rule-making is supportable by free men. It is obvious
that under the large-scale unemployment of the 1930's, the reality
of freedom, guaranteed politically, under the Constitution, was actually lost under the economic exigencies of the period. It was
lost, not because business set out to destroy it, but because where
there is no choice of rule-makers, as under mass unemployment,
no rule however beneficent can be accepted by the individual as a
matter of responsible consent. The economic system as a whole
coerces him even though the particular employing company does
not intend to do so.
Thus we see the tolerable freedom of the governed under
the private rule-making of business, of the stockholders, of the
vendors, of the customers, and of the employees of all rank comes
from the opportunity of all to say, "No! I will do my business
with another business." When the governed man can say "No,"
he has powers as great as those of the strongest business.
II.

THE Govxoas.

To find out realistically how things happen, let us, the governed, approach a business from the outside and work our way in.
We can come at the business either as an employee, a vendor, a
customer, or a stockholder. From whatever point we come, we
run into an employee whose job it is to attend to us. If we are
looking for work, we see an employee of the employment department; if we call to discuss the job we have now, we talk to the
executive to whom we are responsible. If we are a vendor with
something we want to sell to the company, our first contact is
with a representative of the purchasing agent, or the buying office. If we are a customer and wish to buy something for ourselves, or if we wish to discuss something we have already bought,
we meet a salesman or an adjuster. If we are a stockholder, we
first talk to an assistant treasurer, or an assistant secretary, or an
assistant to the president. In every case, we find that the company is represented by a subordinate someone who has authority
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to make certain decisions. In every case, the someone who represents the company gets his authority from a superior source in
the company's management, a source which combines legislative, administrative, and judicial powers. This superior executive may be overruled by an executive superior to him unless he
himself happens to be the chief executive. From whatever angle
we approach a business, as we rise higher and higher through the
levels of authority, we finally come to a chief executive who is
usually the president of the company.
A.

MANAGERIAL OFFICERS

In most things in a business the president is the boss. Working through his subordinates, he gets done the things that have
to be done. In many cases he also decides on the policies that
will be followed in doing them. He can buy and sell, hire and
fire, construct or tear down. Among the few things he cannot
do by himself are to declare a dividend, open a bank account for
the company, sell its securities to the public, or dissolve the
business. Nor can he appoint himself to his own job.
Sometimes a company has an officer who is called chairman of
the board. The powers and duties of a chairman do not follow a
consistent pattern. In general, the powers over policy that are
reserved from the president, and are not reserved to the board of
directors, are exercised by the chairman. The chairman has particular supervisory responsibilities including observation of the
work of the president. It is doubtful if the chairman would give
instructions to the president as to how he should operate the
company even if he had the power to do so. If he did give such
instructions, he would himself be the chief administrative officer
under another name, and the president would then be his assistant. What is important is to realize that there are two related,
separable, top functions: (1) that of long-time policy-planning
with broad consideration of the company's relations to trends
within the industry, in other industries, in the government, and
in international affairs, and (2) that of day-by-day central coordination of operating decisions covering every phase of doing
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efficiently the things it is the business of the company to do. In
many companies, these two functions are carried on by one person.
B. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The powers that are withheld from the president and chairman, or chief executive officer under whatever title, are held by
the board of directors.
Where does the board of directors get its powers? They
come from the laws of the state in which the company gets its
charter to do business. These laws specify what things the board
of directors may do and what things are reserved even from them
to the stockholders. But since stockholders ordinarily have no
powers except at a stockholders' meeting-and such meetings are
infrequent and special meetings are hard to call without the consent of the directors-for practically all purposes, the board of
directors is supreme. This description of where the power in a
company is located is reasonably realistic with one exception, and
here the situation differs greatly from company to company. The
president or chairman of a company generally recommends to the
board of directors what he thinks the board should do even in
the field of the board's own powers. In some companies, such a
recommendation is tantamount to a decision, and although the
recommendation may be discussed and the president may change
his mind, the directors never reverse him. A reversal would be
taken as a vote of no confidence, and his resignation would be
on the table forthwith. In other companies, the executive officer
encourages the board of directors to come to its own decision
on the matters that are its proper concern, for example, on the
declaration of a dividend. The officer may advise the board what
he as an individual would do, but he has no feeling of chagrin or
embarrassment if the board, after talking it over, feels differently.
The directors of a company are persons of considerable importance in rule-making powers of a business. Consequently, it
is a matter of some interest how the members of a board of
directors are chosen and how they are continued in office. At
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this point, the form and the substance of the location of power
in business are far apart.
The form of election of directors is a quasi-democratic procedure for the affirmation of the delegation of power to candidates for election and re-election. The procedure accepts on principle the assumption that the final power over business rule-making resides in the owners of the property, and that the larger the
relative ownership the larger the right to express preference for
the individuals to whom delegated powers should be assigned.
Without raising questions as to these assumptions, it is fair to
note that in substance the selection of directors does not conform
to the intention that the election procedure implies. The fact is
that the stockholders elect the directors but they do not choose
them. They are chosen by the board of directors itself, which
makes the nomination.
The reason for this lack of correspondence of form and substance rests on two practical considerations: (1) the stockholders
cannot choose directors because they are not organized as a political body in a way to make their franchise elective; (2) real
choice of directors by stockholders would be an extremely costly
and disruptive procedure, damaging to efficient management, to
business profits, and to the interests of the stockholders themselves. The stockholders have invested their savings in a business to make profits and income, not to assert rights in the delegation of power. They do not want to be organized politically as
stockholders; they want to be let alone. In this, the management
agrees with them. The occasional crisis situation can be ignored,
since the political organization of stockholders to oust a management is generally so crude as a technique of obtaining stockholder consensus that it is little more than a caricature of the
"democratic" procedure it purports to be.
III.

TnE Locus oF PowER.

We have not been able to put our finger on the exact point
of final power in a company, but we have narrowed its location
down to the board of directors and the two principal officers, the
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chairman and the president. Within the circle of directors and
principal officers, the locus of power differs in different companies
and the same company from time to time. Sometimes it changes
even in the same meeting on different issues. If the chairman or
president is an extremely strong or self-willed individual, he
holds the reins in a firm hand. He may use the members of his
board of directors as a sounding board, as a source of advice,
as a means of access to influence in quarters outside his own
company. But the most dominating governor is likely to pause
if three or more directors differ audibly with his decision. The
next time it may be three other directors who differ, and the
time after that another three. Minorities are helpless alone, but
several minorities may mean a revolt. Whenever ownership and
management are held by different people, it can never be said
that the board of directors does not matter. The locus of power
may, for a moment or on a particular issue, be held by a single
director. Generally this occurs when a strong will holds a negative opinion. It is rare that a single individual on a board of
directors can get positive action taken contrary to the wishes of
the officers.
The decisions that must be made by a company require that
a final source of authority be instantly available. Accordingly,
an executive committee, with power to act for the board of directors between meetings, is set up; and in this committee, the details of questions of policy and operations are examined. Many
decisions are made by the executive committee that need only be
referred to the board for information and ratification. Included
in the membership of the executive committee, there will be one
or more of the executive officers of the company.
The power element in a company is more nearly an area
than a point, a pattern within the executive committee. It shifts
within the boundaries of the board of directors, the executive
committee, and senior officers. Sometimes the focus is sharp,
sometimes it is blurred. It may include one combination of personalities at one time, another at another. Power in a company
within this area seems to go to him who wants it and is able to
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exercise it. For the effectiveness of the company in doing the
things that a company is supposed to do, this shifting character
of the locus of power is desirable. It keeps an administration
from becoming too brittle. It creates a narrow circle where there
is a normal and healthy competition for internal status and recognition. Carried too far, such competition can be destructive to
united efforts, but ordinarily the influence of the board as a
whole moderates the intensity of personal ambitions and divisive
tendencies. When the board itself divides, and continues a division over a period of time, again a pathological condition exists
that is harmful to the business.
From this circle of the board of directors and the two principal officers come the rules, the instructions, and the delegation of
specific responsibility, the provision of means and the outlines
of ways. Here is found the coordination of the parts and of
partial efforts. Within this circle the character of the company
takes form; into it come experience, inspiration, and criticism
from the organization as a whole; and from it flow judgments
which give back to the organization direction and discipline.
A.

IS A BOARD OF DIRECTORS GOOD ENOUGH?

Considering the central position of the board of directors as
an institution, not only in the government of a single business but
in the government of business generally, it is in its present form
an inadequate instrument of power. It is a vestigial remain from
a time when investors paid attention to their businesses and when
offensive and defensive alliances in business were the order of
the day. The most that can be said for the board of directors as
it exists today is that it provides an arena in which the ablest,
most powerful, and most persistent members of the board can
generally have their way. Such men have the traits that make
businesses successful, and their survival in the shifting locus of
power in a company means that they survive not only for their
own good, but for the good of the company too. The board of
directors tends to screen the fit from the unfit, and to that extent
to provide the rule of the fit for the conduct of the business.
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Need anything be done ? If the board of directors is a vestigial and obsolete institution, sooner or later it will disappear
in its present form. This disappearance may come by transformation or it may come by collapse. Collapse is a clumsy and uncertain way of moving from yesterday into tomorrow. Transformation gives an apportunity to consider the question of what
is wanted and to choose the preferred method of getting from here
to there.
B.

WHAT DO WE WANT?

What is it that we want in a board of directors? First, we
want a rule-making body superior to the executive officers that
will contribute to the efficiency of the business. Second, we want
a rule-making body that is sensitive to the interests of all who are
affected by the company as a private government.
When we examine these interests, a curious fact appears.
The interests of the four parties at interest are in part identical
in that each of them benefits by an efficient, well-managed, growing
business. For the stockholders this means the possibility of
larger dividends and a higher market price for their stock. For
the vendors it means a better outlet and prompt payment for the
things they supply. For the customer it means better service,
better quality, and a wider range of products from which to
choose. For the employee it means steadier employment, higher
pay, and better conditions of work. But at any given level of
activity and efficiency of a business, the interests of the four
groups of the governed are in conflict. At a given level of activity,
higher dividends can come only from lower prices to vendors,
higher prices to customers, or lower labor costs. Vendors can get
better consideration only at the expense of stockholders, customers, or employees. Customers must pay higher prices if the
desires of stockholders, vendors, and employees are to be met,
and the employees can improve their earnings only at the expense
of the other three parties at interest. A board of directors, therefore, has a double task, first, to provide the company with an
efficient, aggressive management, and second, to make sure that
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at any given level of activity and efficiency, the groups at interest,
whose interests are necessarily in conflict, get a square deal.
C.

TWO IMPRACTICAL

SUGGESTIONS

There have been two suggestions as to how the several parties
at interest in the operations of a company might be effectively
heard. One suggestion is that each of these groups should be represented by directors of their own choosing. The other is that
there should be a "public" director on the directing board, an
appointee of the Securities and Exchange Commission or of some
other public agency. Neither suggestion meets the requirements
of the situation in more than a formal way, and both should be
rejected as unrealistic and undesirable.
The idea of representation of parties at interest other than
stockholders appeals to those who are attracted by the machinery
of republican democracy, and who would extend it to all fields
where discipline and order make it necessary to have rule-makers
and rules. The fact is that no group can be represented by an
elected agent unless it has been organized to express itself politically. It must have a sense of common interest and a willingness
to take the trouble at an appointed time and place to assert the
privileges of an electorate. There must be understanding, not
only of issues, but of the capacity of the person who stands for
election. Sound choice requires elaborate procedural arrangements, opportunities for discussion and information, candidates,
nominations, and campaigns. The necessary conditions cannot be
established in practice for stockholders; nor can they be established for employees if we include employees of every rank and
skill; nor can they be made to function for customers or vendors.
A scheme of representation of these interests would be a travesty
on democratic procedures. It would result in business political
gangsterism that would destroy the efficiency of business management. It would inject, into circles requiring the most intimate confidence, individuals whose reliability was uncertain and whose
motives and ambitions would be in doubt. A board elected in such
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a manner would be injurious to the true welfare of the four groups
who have an interest in the success of the business.
The second idea, that of "public" directors, appointed by
some designated public agency, appeals to some who distinguish
only two parties at interest in a business: one, the owners; the
other, the general public. But in reality there are four parties at
interest, not two. In some matters these four interests are the
same and in other matters they are in conflict. No "public" representation on a directing board could meet the essential requirements of this rule-making situation. The special and specific
interests of a company's stockholders, its vendors, its customers,
and its employees justify the creation of an opportunity for
expression, but it is they, not an undifferentiated public, that
should be heard by the company's rule-making authority.
D.

ONE MODEST STEP

If we reject these two methods for broadening the composition of a corporate board of directors, what suggestion can be
proposed? No drastic or universally applied scheme of
altering
the composition of boards of directors should be contemplated.
The situations in different companies call for different measures,
or perhaps in some companies for none at all. Further in modifying an agency like a board of directors, it is a good thing to take
a step at a time, to let adjustment and habit build familiArity with
the new, and then move forward with knowledge and conviction
that the direction is the right one.
Accordingly, my suggestion is, as a first step, that one director
be elected or re-elected and that he be asked to act as "trustee"
for one of the three parties at interest, other than the stockholders. Such director-trustee might be assigned the interests of
either the customers, or the vendors, or the employees, depending
on the nature of the company's business. He would be the nominee
of the management and of the existing board of directors and
would be elected in the usual way by the owners of the company,
the stockholders. During the experimental period of whatever
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length, no public announcement would need to be made that such
a policy had been adopted. In a formal sense little is changed,
but an important difference would occur in the deliberations of
the board. Let us suppose that this first director-trustee has been
asked to act for the customers of the company. Although he
owes his nomination to his fellow directors, and his election to the
stockholders, nevertheless he has accepted a trusteeship-a
trusteeship which has been created voluntarily by those choosing
him so to act as trustee. Now as be sits on the board, the interests of the customers of the company are his single interest. It
is his duty to know what these interests are and to see to it that
they are considered when matters affecting them are decided upon.
Such a director-trustee should be chosen for his ability to make
another's case his own. The one limitation that should be observed
is that there should be no conflict of interest in the individual
director himself; for example, a large stockholder should not be
chosen as trustee for the interests of customers. The directortrustee should have time to work on his job and to think about it.
His duties would not require his full time, but they would involve
more application of effort than does the conventional directorship. Such a director should be properly compensated for the
service he performs.
If the first director-trustee works out usefully, the next step
would be a director-trustee for each of the other interests-all
depending on the nature of the company and whether the groups
are important enough in the particular case to warrant specialized
consideration. In this way, three of the four parties at interest
will have someone designated to speak for them. Presumably the
stockholders, -the fourth party, will be the concern of the remaining directors. But to make sure that equally thoughtful attention
will be given to all the stockholders, one director should be explicitly charged with responsibility for all ownership interests and
be paid for taking the time required in doing so.
The board of directors would then consist of four paid director-trustees, the chairman and the president, and such other
officers and directors as the needs and traditions of the company
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dictated. Under such a directing board, the interests of the governed will be at least represented and the actions of the company's administrative officers will take place in a frame of reference where the interests of all will have been heard. The four
director-trustees would sit, not as "representatives" of the interest for which they speak, but as designees of their fellow directors
to give particular attention to their trustee assignments. Since
in any case these four special directors would be interested, even
from the standpoint of their special interest, in the growth and
prosperity of the corporation, and would be individually and
collectively only a minority of the board as a whole, it seems improbable that the divisive interest thus deliberately built into
the board at a low level of power but at a high level of articulate
responsibility would be harmful in any way to a clear-cut and
effective corporate program.
E.

NEED ANYTHING BE DONE?

The question will arise, need anything be done at all? Granted
that the customers, the vendors, and the employees do have an
interest in the kind of business rules to which they are asked
to conform, they have no present rights in the matter. The stockholders have the rights; if they do not choose to exercise them,
that is their right as well. Meanwhile, the business goes on meeting on every side the test of competition, and preserving its
authority as long as the governed consent to the rules that are
imposed. A policy of doing nothing usually seems to be the
prudent policy at any particular time for any particular group
of people. Yet, after something has gone wrong, in retrospect
it is possible to see that adjustment to the times and circumstances would have preserved a continuity of experience and
tradition which, though modified, would not have been dissipated.
In considering whether business should do anything to give
a voice to interests other than those who have rights to express
themselves, we must remember that each business derives its
power and its form from public government in which all these
"interests" do have "rights."
If these interests some day want
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new rights in the government of business, they can be acquired
through orderly public legislative processes.
Today the obvious interests of the several parties subject to
business government are not properly safeguarded under the
present form of control of business power. Since they are not,
someone will some day, perhaps at a most inconvenient time, make
it his crusade to turn these interests into rights. If, before this
happens, the interests of all parties are protected by business
itself, it is unlikely that formal intervention would occur on
grounds of abstract political theory.
The reasons for taking steps to modernize the boards of directors of companies are reasons of efficiency, prudence, and
justice. Fortunately, there is no critical situation that presses
for action, but unfortunately there is under such circumstances
an understandable hesitancy about altering existing and known
power relationships. However, the mere passing of time brings
with it the necessity for specific changes in the personnel of a
board of directors. These occasions, if used to a purpose, may
lead to the transformation of the central agency of corporate
power so that it represents more nearly the interests of those
whom business governs.
IV.

SAFEGUARDING THE Loc s OF POWER.

Because business has become one of the most pervasive facts
of life, the operations of business have acquired a political as well
as an economic significance in the lives of ordinary citizens. The
locus of this political and economic power is in corporate management. We have depended on enterprise and competition as our
methods of placing business powers where they are presently
found. These methods have proved on the whole successful as far
as economic development is concerned, but they alone are inadequate to meet the newer responsibilities of business. Corporate
management, being the locus of business rule-making, has the
opportunity to initiate the transformations that will conserve
the successes of private business government and that at the same
time will safeguard the community from abuses in the exercise of
private power.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.
OFFICE BUILDINGS AND THE NLRB
The question as to whether or not the conduct of operating an office
building is such as to bring the employer of labor within the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act' is often a vexing and troublesome one. As far as the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board is concerned, it should be noted that the Board is generally empowered "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice . . . affecting commerce. "2 The significant phrase used in this
provision, the only one providing any criterion for a determination respecting jurisdiction, is the term "affecting commerce."
That term has
been defined elsewhere in the National Labor Relations Act as referring
to acts done "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or
the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce. "3

Re-definition, however, has been provided by the United States Supreme Court for, in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones-Laughlin
Steel Corporation,4 that court said that although "activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control
is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. '
Chief Justice Hughes there also pointed out that the scope of
the power of Congress to remove obstructions from interstate commerce
must be viewed in the light of the existing dual system of government,
hence should not be extended to such a degree as to embrace within its
purview effects upon interstate commerce which are so remote and indirect that to embrace them would actually obliterate any distinction between the local and the national government.
These observations bring into focus something of the difficulty which
is to be encountered when endeavoring to determine whether the employees of any given office building are covered by the National Labor
129 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.
2 Ibid., § 160 (a).
s Ibid., § 152(7).

4 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, 102 A. L. R. (2d) 1352 (1937).
5301 U. S. 1 at 37, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 at 911, 102 A. L. R. (2d) 1352 at
1365.
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Relations Act. By their very nature, buildings affixed to and forming
parts of real estate typify the idea of things local and immovable in
character. They suggest the very opposite of commerce which, in turn,
signifies movement, flow and action. At first glance, then, it would seem
impossible that any relation should exist between these two opposites.
But, as more thought is given to the problem, one begins to realize that
the connection between office buildings and the stream of commerce is
not so improbable nor so remote as might, at first, appear. If, for instance, a dispute should arise between the management and the janitors
and elevator operators of an office building, which dispute, in turn, leads
to a closing of the building and a shut-down of the operations carried
on therein, the resulting serious interference with business transactions
conducted from the various offices located within the building could have
a marked and grave influence upon the flow of goods in commerce. If, on
the other hand, the amount of business conducted from the building is
comparatively small, the effect of the labor dispute upon interstate
commerce would be negligible in character and might be so slight as to
prevent the case from entering the realm of federal jurisdiction. The
broad contours of demarcation between those office building disputes
which are amenable to federal jurisdiction and those which are not thus
become discernible.
The position which the National Labor Relations Board has taken with
6
respect to office building disputes in general is clearly demonstrated in
7
Matter of Midland Building Company. A Missouri corporation there
operated an office building containing some 93,000 square feet of rentable

space. About twenty-one per cent. of the space was occupied by fifteen
different railroad companies. Other tenants included several construction
and manufacturing firms. The Board refused to take jurisdiction over
a representation petition filed by a union representing the building service employees, declaring that an employer's operation of a' general office
building was an activity essentially local in character. In arriving at
that conclusion, the Board based its opinion to some extent upon the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of 10 East 40th
Street Building, Inc. v. Callus,8 a case arising under the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.9 Although the jurisdictional requirements of
6 A decision by the Board to assert or to refuse to take jurisdiction will usually
be of decisive importance, since the courts will, in general, refrain from disturbing
a determination of the Board as to jurisdictional matters. See National Labor
Relations Board v. Townsend, 185 F. (2d) 378 at 382 (1950), where the court said:
"Providing the Board acts within, its statutory and constitutional power it is not
for the courts to say when that power should be exercised."
778 NLRB 1243 (1948).
8 325 U. S. 578, 65 S. Ct. 1227, 89 L. Ed. 1806 (1945).
9 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
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that statute differ somewhat from those contained in the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board stressed the characterization which the Supreme
Court had placed on the office building there concerned as being an establishment of essentially local nature. It may be seen, then, that a decision
of the Supreme Court on a related question may be of persuasive significance in settling the question of policy determination with respect to
an assertion of jurisdiction.
The Board also pointed out that while, in the case at hand, many
of the tenants of the building were enterprises engaged in interstate
commerce, the activities carried on in the building were predominantly
clerical in nature and constituted a relatively small and unimportant part
of the interstate operations. The services rendered by the building maintenance employees, in turn, were even more remote from the interstate
operations of the tenants, hence it seemed unlikely that a stoppage or
curtailment of the building service operations would have other than a
negligible effect on interstate commerce. One basic point, then, becomes
apparent if this decision is carefully considered, for the refusal of the
Board, barring special circumstances, to take jurisdiction in the average
office building case will undoubtedly be based upon the idea that the operation is essentially of such local nature as to have only minor effects upon
the flow of goods in interstate commerce. 10
The next question which arises, by force of the basic attitude of the
Board outlined in the preceding sentence, may be formulated as follows:
What are the "special circumstances" which will prompt the Board to
assert jurisdiction in a case involving the operation of an office building?
It is necessary, in order to find an answer to that question, to consider
those cases wherein the Board has taken jurisdiction over office building
disputes despite its general policy not to do so in the average case.
The case designated Matter of InternationalTrade Mart" furnishes a
good illustration. A five-story trade mart building located at New Orleans
was operated by a nonprofit corporation formed to develop, promote and
maintain trade and commerce between the people of the United States
and those of other countries, especially in the South American republics.
The building was occupied by some 108 tenants, representing over four
hundred firms, about three-fourths of whom had their principal places of
business outside the State of Louisiana. Seven or eight of the tenants
were foreign governments. All told, merchants of twenty-six foreign
countries were represented. The Board expressly found that no manu10 See also Matter of Corrigan Properties, Inc., 87 NLRB 252 (1949); Matter
of Central Tower, Inc., 84 NLRB 357 (1949).
1187 NLRB 616 (1949).
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facturing, shipping, or processing of goods was performed in the building,
nor were stocks of merchandise maintained therein,'12 for the tenants confined their activities to the promotion of sales by displaying samples of
their wares and the issuance of catalogs listing available merchandise,
although a few tenants took orders for the shipment of goods from distribution outlets located elsewhere.
Contrary to the holding in the Midland Building case discussed above,
the Board declared that the building corporation in the case at hand was
not in the business simply of renting space in a general office building to
a variety of tenants but rather maintained the building for the sole purpose
of promoting international trade, a purpose accomplished by providing a
trade mart or central exhibition space where tenants could display their
products and where buyers and sellers could be brought together. The
Board, therefore, drew certain conclusions which deserve to be quoted
verbatim. It said: "The promotional and sales activities carried on in
the mart plainly are a direct and important factor in the genesis of commercial transactions involving the shipment of goods in interstate or
foreign commerce; otherwise the mart would cease to be dedicated to such
use. A shutdown of the mart would have an immediate and direct adverse
effect on the very interstate and foreign commerce which it was constructed to foster. It would be inaccurate and wholly unrealistic to
characterize such an enterprise as 'essentially local.' We find, therefore,
not simply because of the purpose for which the Employer is organized,
but also because of the use to which the mart is dedicated, that the Employer's operations 'affect commerce' within the meaning of the Act and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction.' "13 An
analysis of this decision clearly reveals one exception to the general rule,
an exception which might be formulated as indicating that the Board will
assert jurisdiction in office building disputes if the use of the building is
devoted, either in its entirety or to a considerable extent, to the furtherance
of interstate or foreign trade.
12 The specific finding poses a question as to whether or not, if some tenants

engage in manufacturing processes or store goods in an office building, the Board

-will assert jurisdiction. No case has been found which contains a specific answer
to that question.
13 87 NLRB 616 at 617. In a footnote appended by the Board to this case, it
pointed out that the decision in Borella v. Borden, 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223, 89
L. Ed. 1865 (1945), also a case arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act, resembled the situation before it more closely than the parallel constructed between
the case of 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578, 65 S. Ct.
1227, 89 L. Ed. 1806 (1945), and the Board holding in Matter of Midland Building
The United States Supreme Court, in the
Company, 78 NLRB 1243 (1948).
Borella case, had held that maintenance employees in an office building owned
by The Borden Company and predominantly dedicated to use as a headquarters
for conducting its far-flung interstate business, were necessary to the production
of goods for commerce, hence were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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While the use to which a building has been put has served as a
criterion, another line of cases adds the element of ownership as an item
having bearing upon the use of the building. In Matter of Texas Company, 4 for example, the corporation owning the office building there
involved was engaged in producing, manufacturing and marketing crude
oil and its products. It operated approximately eight thousand wells and
23 refineries situated in several states. It marketed its products through
numerous dealers in all the states of the Union. There was no doubt that
the company itself was engaged in interstate commerce. The office building in question, located in Houston, Texas, thirteen stories high and covering one-quarter of a city block, was occupied in its entirety by the company
and its subsidiaries. The company strenuously objected to the taking of
jurisdiction by the Board of a representation proceeding brought by the
maintenance employees of the building, contending that the work of the
maintenance employees was purely local in character, without substantial
relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the states.
The Board rejected the contention, refusing to regard the building
maintenance operations of the company as something entirely separate
and distinct from its admitted interstate business. The office building
was not operated as a separate enterprise but as one of the executive
offices from which a substantial part of the vast interstate enterprise was
directed. In that connection, the Board pointed out that its stand had
been inferentially approved by several of the Courts of Appeal of the
United States which had granted enforcement to several of its orders
directing reinstatement of building maintenance employees, or the carrying
on of collective bargaining with representatives of both production and
building maintenance employees, in cases where the employer had carried
on an interstate business or industry from its own building.1 5
In this and in other similar cases reaching the same result, the
building was owned and operated, in its entirety, by the employer for
the purpose of carrying on an interstate business. What of the situation
where the corporate owner uses only part of the building for its own
purposes and rents the balance of the space to various tenants? The
1421 NLRB 110 (1940).
15 In Matter of American Potash & Chemical Corporation, 3 NLRB 140 (1937),
the Board had directed reinstatement with back pay of a "relief" Janitor found to
have been discriminated against. The order was subsequently enforced in National Labor Relations Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F. (2d)
488 (1938), cert. den. 306 U. S. 643, 59 S. Ct. 582, 83 L. Ed. 1043 (1939). Board
orders directing that collective bargaining be carried on with representatives of
both production and maintenance employees have also been enforced by the U. S.
Court of Appeals in National Labor Relations Board v. Piqua Munising Wood
Products Co., 109 F. (2d) 552 (1940), and in National Labor Relations Board v.
Louisville Refining Co., 102 F. (2d) 678 (1939).
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answer to this question may be found in the case of Butler Brothers v.
National Labor Relations Board" as well as in certain Board decisions
dealing with that problem.1" In the Butler Brothers case, the company,
engaged in large scale interstate sales transactions, operated two 15-story
buildings in Chicago known as Buildings A and B. The buildings were
separated by a city street. While the company had its store and warehouse in building A, it occupied only a small portion of the other building
and leased the remainder thereof to some forty tenants who were engaged
generally in the manufacture, sale and distribution of goods throughout
the country.
In an unfair labor practice case involving the company and its maintenance employees in both buildings, the Court of Appeals, enforcing an
order of the Board, expressly recognized the Board's jurisdiction with
respect to the office buildings in question. It declared that the maintenance
employees performed a service directly connected with and for the benefit
not only of the company but of the many tenants as well. Since the
company and its various tenants were engaged in interstate commerce,
the services of the maintenance employees, in hauling freight and passengers to and from the offices and in cleaning and maintaining the lobbies
and stairways, were closely associated with the flow of interstate commerce
so as to entitle these employees to the protection of the statute involved.
It is obvious that the court, in reaching this decision, not only took
into consideration the interstate activities of the company which owned
and partly occupied the building but also the character of the activities
of the various tenants who occupied a considerable portion of the space
in one of the buildings. In another case, that of Matter of Southern
California Edison Company, Ltd., 8 however, one in which the company
owned and operated a 13-story office building and occupied only forty
per cent. of the rentable space to house its executive offices, the Board
did not concern itself with the character of the rest of the tenants who had
rented more than a majority of the space but asserted jurisdiction by
pointing to the fact that the operations of the company affected interstate
commerce, that a disturbance among the building maintenance employees
would interfere with the operation of the office building, and that the work
performed in the executive offices constituted an integral and necessary
part of the enterprise.
The Board went one step farther in Matter of First National Bank
16134 P. (2d) 981 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 789, 64 S. Ct. 203, 88 L. Ed. 475

(1943).
17 See, for example, Matter of Tri-State Casualty Ins. Co., 83 NLRB 828 (1949).

1856 NLRB 1172 (1944).
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BuTilding Corporation' for it there asserted jurisdiction not on the basis
of legal ownership of the building but upon the ground of actual control,
cutting across legal technicalities to achieve its decision. The corporation
holding title to the building concerned had, as its only business, the operation of an office building. It, in turn, was owned by the two tenants, a
bank and a railroad, both being engaged in interstate commerce. The
bank owned fifty-one per cent. of the stock of the building corporation
and occupied fifteen per cent. of the rentable space. The railroad owned
the balance of the stock and occupied the remainder of the space. The
Board held that the operation of the building affected interstate commerce.
In order to reach that conclusion, it had to distinguish the case before it
from the Midland Building situation. It did so by pointing to the fact
that the operation did not involve a general office building but, rather,
dealt with a combination of two employers, each engaged in interstate
commerce, joining for the purpose of procuring necessary business and
office space through the medium of a wholly-owned subsidiary. It saw
no significant difference between the instant situation and one in which
a single company, engaged in interstate commerce, directly provides its
own office building from which to carry on business.
A logical sequel developed in the case of Matter of Intertoum Corpo0
ration.2
The Michigan corporation there concerned owned and had its
office and principal place of business in a 34-story office building in Detroit,
Michigan. The corporation was engaged in the business of owning and
operating real estate, operating as a real estate broker, and making loans
and investments. Among its tenants in the building were retail stores,
insurance companies, bus companies, a radio station, sales agencies, advertising companies, doctors, and a miscellany of other tenants. The
corporation was one of a large group of apparently closed corporations
forming a pyramid dominated by one man who was the president of most
of them. It owned controlling interests in two of the insurance companies
maintaining their home offices in the building, as well as in a real estate
corporation, a coach company, and other corporations operating outside
the state. These factors prompted the Board to hold the building operation to be one which affected interstate commerce.
When these cases are considered as a group, it becomes apparent that
the decisive element in the relation of the operation of an office building
to interstate commerce will be the purpose for which the building is
designated and the use to which it has been devoted. If the building is
devoted to the furtherance of interstate and foreign trade either (a)
19 87 NLRB 1109 (1949).
20 90 NLRB No. 151 (1950).
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directly, as by providing exhibition and office space to out-of-state business
enterprises, 21 or (b) indirectly, as by being owned or controlled by some
industry engaged in interstate commerce which uses the entire building
or some part of it to house its executive or administrative offices, or those
of its subsidiaries, then the Board will generally assume jurisdiction and
declare that the operations of the building will affect commerce. The
amount of yearly rentals paid by out-of-state tenants who use the building,
however, will not be considered to be a determinative factor by the Board
nor will it have bearing upon the decision to take or refuse to take jurisdiction, particularly since the operation of an office building housing a
variety of tenants is, in general, a matter of local consequence not covered
by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
F. HiRRZoo

21 Local illustrations may be found in the Chicago Furniture Mart and, possibly,
the Chicago Merchandise Mart.
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AND AFFILIATIONS IS A VALID PREREQUISITE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PUB-

LIC BENEFITS OR THE SECURING OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-TWO

recent

cases

deal with the "cold war" problem of the validity of legislation requiring
a person, under oath, to disclose his political beliefs and affiliations as a
prerequisite to receipt of public benefits or to appointment to public employment.

In one such case, that of Dworken v. Collopy,1 an inferior

1 91 N. E. (2d) 564 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1950).
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Ohio tribunal declared that provision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act to be valid which states that an individual who advocates,
or who is a member of a party which advocates, overthrow of the government by force shall not be eligible for compensation. 2 The statute in
question, among other things, required the claimant for unemployment
compensation benefits to attach to his claim a written affidavit amounting
to a test oath of eligibility. The plaintiff, in his character as taxpayer,
unsuccessfully advanced a claim of unconstitutionality predicated on an
alleged infringement on the right of free speech as well as because the
statute possessed ex post facto effects. In the other case, that of Garner
v. Board of Public Works of the City of Los Angeles, a California intermediate appellate court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal
ordinance which required a loyalty oath of its employees and also required
the inclusion, within such oath, of a statement that the employee had not,
within five years, advocated or taught the overthrow of the government
by force. The plaintiffs there, some seventeen city employees who had
been discharged for refusal to comply with the ordinance, sought a writ
of mandate directing their reinstatement. The petition was denied by the
trial court and that holding was affirmed when the appellate court could
find no violation of the right of freedom of speech.
The major constitutional question with which the courts have been
confronted in determining the validity of loyalty-oath legislation has been
whether such compulsory disclosures of political beliefs and affiliations
serve to violate constitutional rights to free speech. The conception that
the right of free speech necessarily includes the right to be silent finds
support in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette4 in which case it was held
that a state statute requiring public school pupils to give a prescribed
salute and to pledge allegiance to the American flag was an unconstitutional attempt to control national unity and political beliefs. The court
there asserted that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."5 Pointing
out that "censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated
by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present
danger of action of the kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish," the court there reasoned that "it would seem that involuntary
affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent
grounds than silence.'
2 Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Cum. Supp. 1949, §§1345-6(d) (2) (a).
8 98 Cal. App. (2d) 493, 220 P. (2d) 958 (1950).

4819 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
5 319 U. S. 624 at 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 at 1639.
6 319 U. S.624 at 633, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 at 1635.
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Subsequent thereto, however, in the case of American Communications Association v. Dowds 7 the court upheld the provision of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 which conditioned the right of a labor
union to present cases to the National Labor Relations Board upon the
filing of affidavits by its officers, as well as by the officers of the parent
organization, that they were not members or supporters of the Communist
Party." The court there apparently recognized that one is entitled to
believe and to advocate what he chooses, including the right to be silent
about those matters, unless there is a clear and present danger that a
substantial public evil will result therefrom. Unlike the situation in the
Barnette case, the court seemed to recognize the possibility of a clear and
present danger arising from permitting Communists to hold office in a labor
union, hence found justification for the denial of the benefit of a government service to a union if its officers refused to take a loyalty oath.
The holding was not based on the assumption that all those who refused
to take the oath were subversive but rather that the requirement for such
an oath was, in effect, a reasonable means of insuring against an evil
which Congress had a right to prevent, i. e. subversive control of the labor
forces of the nation.
The decision of the California court in the Garner case, following and
quoting from the Dowds case,9 clearly subordinates the right to be silent
concerning one's political affiliations and teachings to the superior public
interest in a "loyal" public service, 10 just as the right in regard to one's
political beliefs was there subordinated to the public interest in a "loyal"
labor movement. While the court did not say it saw a clear and present
7339 U. S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925 (1950).
829 U. S. C. A. § 159(h), sub. 9(h).
9 The court also relied on the decision of the California Appellate Court in
Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 481, 199 P. (2d) 429 (1948), which upheld a
fact-finding program of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County designed
to require county civil service employees to swear allegiance to the federal and
state constitutions as well as to compel answer, under oath, of advocacy of
seditious concepts or membership in organizations formed to advocate the overthrow of government by force. No violation of a right to freedom of speech was
there found to exist because it was said that the county employees had by accepting public employment, foregone privileges they might have had as private citizens.
The oath there required was found to be a lawful safeguard against the dangers
likely to arise from the hiring or retention of disloyal government employees.
10 The California court noted that the question whether the legislature could
compel disclosure of mere beliefs or opinions in contrast to prior overt acts was
not presented. The ordinance in question required an averment as to whether or
not the public employee was then, or ever had been, a member of the Communist
Party and advocated, or had advocated, within five years, the overthrow of the
government by force, These provisions were interpreted as referring to overt
acts rather than beliefs. The oath involved in the Dowds case specifically referred
to a "belief" on the subject. It will be worth while to note whether future distinctions of this nature will be made.
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danger of a substantive evil resulting from disloyal persons holding public
posts, the fact that it regarded the oath requirement as a reasonable step
11
in the loyalty program can have that meaning and only that meaning.
The decision in the Collopy case, on the other hand, represents a
radical extension of the doctrine of the Dowds case, for the parties there
required to declare their loyalty were not public employees nor even individuals holding strategic or influential positions in industry but were
simply claimants for unemployment compensation benefits. Such being
the case, it would appear that the Ohio court must have felt that all persons who advocate the overthrow of the government offer a clear and
present danger to the community, regardless of their status. It would,
seemingly, simplify the test of constitutionality to the point where no
inquiry is necessary other than to determine whether a reasonable relation
exists in conditioning the right to a public benefit on the taking of a
loyalty oath. No other court has gone thus far to date.
In answer to the ex post facto argument, the Ohio court pointed out
that: (1) the statute before it, unlike the California regulation involved
in the Garner case, had no relation to past activities or allegiances but
spoke only of the present; and (2) the statute was not penal in nature.
It was "not intended," the court emphasized, "as a means to punish anyone for past conduct or affiliations. "12 The decision may be highly significant in this respect, for it may serve to indicate what could prove to
be an important and highly necessary limitation on legislation of this
type.' 3 The California case, decided some three months later, might have
produced a different result if the court had considered the Ohio decision
for the ordinance there upheld clearly required an inquiry into past as
well as present conduct and beliefs.
An analogous problem may arise when a state attempts to impose a
11 In the Ohio case of Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 N. E. (2d)
18 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1950), similar reasoning was utilized to uphold the validity
of a non-Communist loyalty oath prescribed for public school teachers. After
developing numerous reasons for declaring Communist teachers to be a threat to
the nation and the state, the court said the regulations adopted represented "sincere and laudable efforts to protect our children from the susceptibility of such
harm." See 94 N. E. (2d) 18 at 32.
12 91 N. E. (2d) 564 at 572. On that basis, the court distinguished the situation
before it from the one involved in Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.)
277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1867), which had declared a Missouri test oath statute to be
invalid because directed against those who had seen service in the Confederate
forces.
13 In Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 N. E. (2d) 18 (Ohio Com.
Pleas, 1950), the same plaintiff as in the principal Ohio case unsuccessfully challenged a program calling for oaths from teachers, which oaths pertained only
to present beliefs and called for no penalty. A different court there concerned
approved the reasoning used in the instant case on the ex post facto aspect of
the problem.
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nonsubversive pledge on an elected public official or a candidate for
public office. A New Jersey statute, for example, required candidates for
certain state offices to take an oath that they did not advocate the forceful overthrow of the government and were not members of any group
dedicated to such a purpose.14 This provision was held invalid, in Imbrie
v. Marsh, 5 because in certain instances the language of the oath of office
was set forth in the state constitution, while in the other instances at
least the ground to be covered by the oath was so described. The New
Jersey court indicated that the legislature had no power to require an
oath different from or in addition to that prescribed by the constitution. 6
The existence of such constitutional provisions, however, did not prevent
the Maryland court, in Shub v. Simpson, 7 from upholding a state statute
which required a candidate for state public office to file an affidavit with
his nomination certificate that he was not a subversive person.' 8 The
statute was said to be justified under the rationale that it did not provide
an additional oath of office but was merely a proper exercise of the "inherent power to safeguard elections" by preventing the submission to
the electorate of the names of those who would be ineligible to hold office. 9
One could only hazard a guess as to the probable validity of legislation requiring a loyalty oath as a condition to private employment, proposals for which have arisen during this "cold war" era. If the "clear
and present" danger test is to be utilized by the courts in this regard,
much of the reasoning used to justify the demand for oaths from public
employees and labor leaders, persons whose positions clearly affect the
public interest, will be inapplicable. In addition to a constitutional guarantee of free speech, the right to work for a living in a lawful occupation,
well established under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, should not
14 N. J. Stat. Ann., Cum. Supp. 1949, § 41:1-1 et seq., and § 19:13-18.
153 N. J. Super. 578, 71 A. (2d) 352 (1950).
16 The New Jersey decision should be of special interest in Illinois for the state
constitution provides for the form of the oath of office to be taken by members
of the General Assembly as well as that required of other civil officers: Ill. Const.
1870, Art. IV, § 5, and Art. V, § 25. The last mentioned section provides that "no
other oath, declaration or test shall be required as a qualification."
17Md.-, 76 A. (2d) 332 (1950).
Is Flack Ann. Code Md., Art. 85A, § 15, added by Laws 1949, Ch. 86. The provision was held not to be applicable to candidates for federal offices, such as congressmen, on the ground the state had no right to add to the qualifications laid
down in the federal constitution.
19 In a brief per curiam opinion filed in the case of Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, - U. S. -, 71 S. Ct. 565, 95 L. Ed. (adv.)
495 (1951), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, - Md. -, 78 A. (2d) 660 (1951). The effect of which
was "to deny the appellant a place on the ballot for a Municipal election . . . on
the ground that she had refused to file an affidavit" as was required by the
same statute which had been referred to in the Shub case. The court agreed
that the statutes, as construed in the Shub case, involved no federal constitutional
question.
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be overlooked. But valid or not, the effectiveness of legislation calling for
test oaths is questionable. Why, for example, should it be supposed that
a subversive individual would hesitate to perjure himself when his scruples
have not prevented him from being subversive? Furthermore, the type
of conduct concerning which disclosure under oath is most frequently
sought is often itself of criminal character, 20 which conduct should have
been uncovered by proper and efficient police work. There is also more
in the spirit which lies behind
than a little of that which is un-American
21
legislation of the kind here noted.
H. L.

BLOSTEIN

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-PERSONS ENTITLED AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES-WHETHER A SURVIVINTG JOINT TENANT WHO HAS SLAIN THE
CO-TENANT OBTAINS CLEAR TITLE TO THE JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY BY
VIRTUE OF THE RIGHT OF' SuRVvoasHiIP-The Illinois Supreme Court, in

the recent case of Welsh v. James,' had occasion to pass for the first time
on a unique problem concerning the rights of a surviving joint tenant,
who had slain his co-tenant, in the jointly owned property. The defendant there concerned and his wife held title to four tracts of land and three
bank accounts in joint tenancy. While so holding such property, he unlawfully killed his wife but, having then been declared insane, he was
not tried for the offense. When defendant was subsequently restored to
sanity, the heirs at law of the deceased wife sued to establish a constructive
trust for their benefit, claiming that defendant held an undivided onehalf interest in the several properties for them with a reversion in their
favor as to the other one-half interest subject only to a life estate in favor
of defendant. A motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action was sustained and, a freehold being involved, plaintiffs
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The decree dismissing the complaint was there affirmed.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 558, for example, makes it a crime "for
any person openly to advocate, by word of mouth or writing, the reformation or
overthrow by violence or any other unlawful means, of the representative form
of government now secured to the citizens of the United States and the several
states by the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the several

states."
21 Professor Henry Steele Commager, writing in Harper's Magazine for September, 1947, under the title "Who is Loyal to America?" states: ". . . loyalty is not
conformity. It is not passive acquiescence in the status quo. It is not preference
for everything American over everything foreign. It is not an ostrich-like ignorance
of other countries and institutions. It is not the indulgence in ceremony-a flag
salute, an oath of allegiance, a fervid verbal declaration. It is not a particular
creed, a particular version of history, a particular body of economic practices, a
particular philosophy . . . It is a realization that America was born of revolt,
flourished on dissent, became great through experimentation . . . Every effort
to confine Americanism to a single pattern, to constrain it to a single formula, is
disloyal to everything that is valid in Americanism."
1408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951).
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In reaching that solution, the court examined the nature of the interest
created in the property as well as the mode adopted for its creating
and, finding that the interest had been created by grant, concluded that
the defendant was seized of the whole estate, as had been the case with
his wife until her death, from the moment the interest was first acquired.
To hold that the defendant was no more than a constructive trustee would
be to divest him of an interest in the property in violation of that provision of the state constitution which declares that "no conviction shall
work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.' '2 In the light thereof,
as well because of statutory penalties placed on unlawful homicide by the
Criminal Code, the two constituting a declaration of public policy in the
matter, the court felt compelled to affirm the decree.
Relatively few cases exist presenting the problem involved in the instant case and, of these, the majority reach an opposite result. Two cases
cited by the court, one involving a joint bank account 3 and the other involving realty held by tenants by entirety, 4 have achieved the same result.
In all other cases, the wrongdoer has been divested of the jointly owned
property either upon the constructive trust theory, expressly disapproved
in the present case, or upon a tenancy-in-common theory. Under the first
of these, and relying on a principle that no man should be permitted to
profit by his own wrongdoing, a constructive trust has been invoked for
the benefit of the heirs of the deceased co-tenant,5 but certain differences
may be noted. In Sherman v. Weber,6 for example, a trust was declared
in favor of the wife's heirs to the extent of a one-half interest for the remainder of her normal life expectancy on the proposition that, as the wife
was older than the husband, he in all probability would have outlived
her. Where the age differential has been reversed, however, the result
has been to declare a trust in the full property subject to the use and
enjoyment of a one-half interest for the remainder of the surviving joint
tenant's life.7 Other cases apply the doctrine to its fullest extent and declare a trust as to the entire property." While the result reached in
2 Ill.

Const. 1870, Art. II, § 11.

3 0ieff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935). Williams, J., wrote a
dissenting opinion.
4 Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. 108 (1907). Another
case directly in point is Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P. (2d) 971 (1939).
5 The theory has been held inapplicable to a case where a wife killed her husband
while she was afflicted with somnambulism on the ground that she was not a wrongdoer: In re Eckhardt's Estate, 184 Misc. 642, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 484 (1945).
6 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 A. 517 (1933).
7 Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927).
8 Bierbrauer v. Moran, 224 App. Div. 87, 279 N. Y. S. 176 (1935); In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. S. 116 (1925) ; Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103
Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

these cases might seem desirable on the basis of the purely moral considerations involved, it cannot be denied that these courts have overlooked
not only the true nature of the interest created under a joint tenancy but
also the nature of the constitutional prohibition against a forfeiture of
estate.
The tenancy in common theory finds expression in very few cases.
It is predicated on the proposition that the rules relating to joint tenancies
contemplate a normal death so that the question of the survival of one of
the joint tenants over the other should be subject only to the natural
vicissitudes of life. Where one of the joint tenants disrupts this normal
process his act, in effect, severs the joint tenancy relationship, leading to
a tenancy in common between the slayer and the heirs of the victim. The
cases which endorse this rule purport to go behind the fiction of joint
tenancy in order to avoid the stigma of violating the constitutional prohibition against forfeiture of estate,9 but while they avoid the high degree
of uncertainty prevalent in the constructive trust cases and prevent the
wrongdoer from taking advantage of his criminal acts they disregard the
true nature of the estate in joint tenancy and violate the clear constitutional prohibition against forfeiture. The action of the court in the instant case, therefore, even if it represents a minority view, reaches the
only, at present, legally justifiable result.
This does not mean that Illinois courts are necessarily and irrevocably
committed to the law expressed in the case for the ethical problem involved
could be resolved by proper action on the part of the legislature. Pennsylvania has adopted a so-called "slayer statute" which might well serve
as a model for other states. 10 While it covers all aspects of the wrongdoer's connection with realty, it particularly deals with the joint tenancy
situation by giving the decedent victim's estate an immediate one-half
interest to be increased by the other half upon the death of the slayer,",
unless the slayer shall have obtained a severance of the property or a. decree granting partition. 12 Any joint tenancy created under such a statute
would be governed by its terms so as to make the right of survivorship
9 Ashwood v. Paterson, Fla. -, 49 So. (2d) 848 (1951) ; Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S. W. (2d) 464 (1948); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27
S. W. (2d) 757 (1930).
10 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Cum. Supp. 1950, Tit. 20, Ch. 10, § 3441 et seq. The
text thereof seems to have been drawn almost verbatim from Wade, "Acquisition
of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution," 49 Harv. L. Rev.
715 (1936). Other law review notes appear in 44 Harv. L. Rev. 125 and 29 Mich.
L. Rev. 745.
11 Ibid., § 3441.1.
12 Ibid., § 3446, also covers the situation likely to develop where the joint tenancy arrangement exists between more than two persons. It also recognizes the
possibility of a trust by agreement or arising from the contribution of a greater
proportion of the price by one of the parties.
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depend upon a lack of wilful participation by the survivor in the cause
of the deceased joint tenant's death, thereby obviating a violation of the
constitutional provision against forfeiture. It would also serve to avoid
any confusion inherent in an application of mortality tables for it establishes a conclusive presumption that the deceased victim would have outlived the slayer, regardless of the respective ages of the parties.
A secondary question appears to be raised by the opinion in the instant case, at least by way of inference, and that is one dealing with the
right of a slayer to inherit, or to take by devise or bequest. One of the
major cases cited by the court in support of its holding in the instant case
was the earlier Illinois decision in Wall v. Pfanschmidt,13 handed down
prior to the enactment of any statute on the general subject. It was
there held that the constitutional prohibition against forfeiture of estate
was a good defense to a suit designed to prevent a murderer from inheriting from his victim. Since that decision, certain statutory provisions
have been enacted 1 but no cases have, as yet, been decided thereunder.
The approval given by the court to the holding in the Wall case might
lead one to a belief that, upon such a suit being presented, the court
could hold those sections of the statute to be unconstitutional.
Again, an examination of the decisions of other jurisdictions which
have dealt with the problem, in the absence of statutory provision, discloses
an apparent lack of uniformity. In those cases which have reached the
same conclusion as that obtained in the Wall case 5 primary consideration
has been given to the constitutional prohibition involved and the unambiguous nature of the statutes relating to descent of property. In those
cases which reach a contrary conclusion,"6 the basic emphasis has been
placed on the public policy argument that no man shall be allowed to profit
13 265 Il.

180, 106 N. E. 785 (1914).

14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 167 and § 201.

15 Crumley v. Hall, 202 Ga. 588, 43 S. E. 646 (1947) ; Hagen v. Cone, 21 Ga. App.
416, 94 S. E. 602 (1917); Hill v. Noland, 149 S. W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912);
McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 P. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky.
793, 185 S. W. 487 (1916); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935
(1894) ; Owens v. Owens, 10 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888) ; Holloway v. McCormick,
41 Okla. 1, 136 P. 1111 (1913) ; DeGraffenreid v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., 20 Okla.
687, 95 P. 624 (1908) ; Deem v. Millikin, 6 Ohio Cir. R. 357 (1892); In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 29 Pa.
Super. 255 (1905).
16 Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 54, 22 So. (2d) 525 (1945) ; Price v. Hittaffer, 164
Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933) ; Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565,
139 N. E. 816 (1923) ; Eisenhardt v. Siegel, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S. W. (2d) 810 (1938) ;
Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908) ; Whitney v. Lott, 134
N. J. Eq. 586, 32 A. (2d) 888 (1944); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E.
188 (1899) ; In re Spark's Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 926 (1939) ; In
re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N. Y. S. 738 (1914) ; Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919).
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from his own wrongdoing and on the theory that the constitutional prohibition is inapplicable as there is no deprivation of property but only the
prevention of the acquisition of rights in property. Without attempting
to analyze these theories but merely presenting them as being of historical importance, it is interesting to note that, at present, almost every
jurisdiction has a statute designed to prevent a murderer from acquiring
the property of the victim and the cases which have arisen thereunder
have uniformly held these statutes to be constitutional,' either by way of
recognition of a change in public policy or because of a judicial belief
that such statutes do not cause a forfeiture. The Illinois court could, and
most likely would, side with that view.
It should be noted, however, that the holding on any particular set
of facts falling within this general field cannot easily be determined in
advance. Where statutory regulation exists some unusual results have
been obtained because of varying statutory language. For example, a
slayer convicted of manslaughter was allowed to inherit in one jurisdiction
because the statute there required a conviction for murder in order to be
operative.18 It has been said that a widow who has slain her husband is
entitled to her widow's distributive share as the same is more nearly in
the nature of a right of contract rather than one of inheritance. 19 An heir
who had committed suicide after murdering the ancestor has been de20
clared to be a source of inheritance for lack of a conviction for murder,
while an out-of-state conviction has been said to be insufficient in another
case. 2 1 It was held, in Ward v. Ward,2 2 under a statute that required
proof that the murderer had killed for the purpose of inheriting from the
victim, that a conviction for murder without proof of the requisite purpose behind the act was not enough to disinherit. Of course, a subsequent
17 Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 F. 776 (1920); In re Lysholm's Estate, 79 Cal.
App. (2d) 467, 179 P. (2d) 833 (1947) ; Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.
(2d) 514 (1950); In re Kuhn's Estate, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N. W. 151 (1904); Hogg
v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 P. 1021 (1926) ; Hamblin v. Marchant, 104 Kan. 689,
180 P. 811 (1919) ; Wilson v. Bates, 313 Ky. 333, 231 S. W. (2d) 39 (1950) ; Parker
v. Potter, 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68 (1931) ; Egelhoff v. Pressler, 16 Ohio Supp.
195 (1945) ; Winters Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shields, 3 Ohio Supp. 134 (1939) ;
In re Norton's Estate, 175 Ore. 115, 151 P. (2d) 719, 156 A. L. R. 617 (1944) ; In re
Moore's Estate, 50 Pa. D. & C. 183 (1943) ; In re Hoffman's Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C.
208 (1940) ; Smith v. Todd, 155 S. C. 323, 152 S. E. 506 (1930) ; Ward v. Ward,
174 Va. 331, 6 S. E. (2d) 664 (1940).
18 In re Lysholm's Estate, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 467, 179 P. (2d) 833 (1947). See
also In re Moore's Estate, 50 Pa. D. & C. 183 (1943).
19 In re Kuhn's Estate, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N. W. 151 (1904).
20 Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P. (2d) 514 (1950) ; Hogg v. Whitham,
120 Kan. 341, 242 P. 1021 (1926) ; Parker v. Potter, 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68
(1931) ; Smith v. Todd, 155 S. C. 323, 152 S. E. 506 (1930).
21 Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 F. 776 (1920).
22174 Va. 331, 6 S. E. (2d) 664 (1940).
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declaration of insanity, which would operate to prevent a trial of the
killer, would preserve the right of inheritance where conviction for the
crime is an essential prerequisite to bring the statute into the case. 23
It would seem obvious, then, that the real problem is not so much
whether a constitutional statute could be drafted but rather whether adequate language can be devised to meet the peculiar sets of facts likely to
arise. The Pennsylvania statute mentioned above possesses merit in that
no conviction is required, but it does insist that the killing be wilful and
unlawful. If the insane slayer, for example, is to be penalized by being
deprived of his rights as a joint tenant or as an heir, the proposed model
would have to be suitably altered.
A. L. WYMAN, JR.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-RIGHTS

AND

LIABILITIES

OF

HEMS AND

OR NOT, WHERE INTESTACY HAS BEEN FOUND TO
EXIST, A BONA FIDE PURCHASER-OF PROPERTY FROM AN HEIR IS PROTECTED
DISTRIBUTEES-WHETHER

AGAINST CLAIMS BY DEVISEE NAMED IN A SUBSEQUENTLY PROBATED WrLir-

The Supreme Court of Illinois had occasion to decide a relatively rare
question when it considered the direct appeal taken in the case of Eckland v. Jankowski.' The action was for partition of land. One Hegstad
who was shown to be the last owner of the record title to the realty in
question died supposedly intestate in January, 1945. Soon after his
death, application for administration of his estate was made to and granted
by the probate court of Cook County. The court found that he died intestate and declared his heirship. After the administration proceedings had
been concluded and the administrator had been discharged, the premises
were conveyed by the heirs-at-law to the defendants' predecessors in title.
Approximately six months after the defendants had acquired title to the
disputed property a will of the decedent was discovered and admitted to
probate. Under the provisions of that will the plaintiff was devised a onehalf interest in the realty. It was his contention that when the will was
admitted to probate his title was perfected as of the date of the testator's
death under the doctrine of relation back 2 and was not divested by the
conveyance of the heirs-at-law. The defendants, however, contended that
since they were innocent purchasers for value from the lawful heirs of
the decedent owner, in reliance upon the public records which gave them
no actual or constructive notice of the existence of a will or that anyone
23 Winters Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shields, 3 Ohio Supp. 134 (1939); In re
Hoffman's Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C. 208 (1940).
1407 Ill. 263, 95 N. E. (2d) 342 (1950). Another aspect of the case is discussed
in 39 Il1. Bar J. 412.
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 205 recognizes this doctrine.
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other than those persons designated by the statute of descent had any
interest in the premises, the statutory effect of the admission of the
will to probate was not applicable so as to divest them of their title.
The circuit court, after a hearing on the merits, dismissed the complaint
for want of equity. The Supreme Court squarely deciding the issue for
the first time in Illinois3 affirmed the decree of the lower court on the
ground that the purchasers had the right to rely on the devolution of
title shown by the record.
The courts have considered this problem in relation to two fact situations: (1) those where the purchase was from a putative heir of a
supposed intestate which purchase was followed by the probate of a will;
and (2) those wherein the purchase was from an heir of a supposed intestate after the ancestor's estate had been administered followed by the
subsequent discovery and probate of a will.
As to the first fact situation, there is no apparent reason why the
vendee who has purchased from a person allegedly entitled as heir should
be protected in his title and prejudice the rights of innocent third parties
when his reliance upon the representations of his vendor was misplaced.
However, the reported cases have been divided on the question of protecting the purchaser's title in such a situation. Those jurisdictions
which have refused protection to the purchaser have in the main done so
on the basis of the doctrine that probate of the will relates back to the
death of the testator and avoids all dispositions and conveyances by the
heirs contrary to the provisions of the will in the absence of any statutory limitation as to the time when a will may be probated.4 The doctrine
that real property descends to the heirs-at-law of the deceased, unless a
devise thereof is affirmatively shown, coupled 'with an extended lapse of
time prior to the conveyance by the heirs, was made the foundation for
protecting the purchaser in other jurisdictionsY In none of these cases
was there any evidence that the estate of the decedent had gone through
administration.
3 See Cassem v. Prindle, 258 Ill. 11, 101 N. E. 241 (1913), for a case in which
the bona fide remote grantee was not a party to the action but whose title was
held valid in spite of the fact that his vendor's title was taken with knowledge
of the decedent's will and in fraud of the rights of the devisees.
4 Cole v. Shelton, 169 Ark. 695, 276 S. W. 993, 43 A. L. R. 1008 (1925) ; Reid's
Adm'r. v. Benge, 112 Ky. 810, 66 S. W. 997, 57 L. R. A. 253, 99 Am. St. Rep. 334
(1902) ; Van Syckel v. Beam, 110 Mo. 589, 19 S. W. 946 (1892) ; Cooley v. Lee,
170 N. C. 18, 86 S. E. 720 (1915).
5 Barnes v. Gunter, 111 Minn. 383, 127 N. W. 398 (1910) ; Wright v. Eakin, 151
Tenn. 681, 270 S. W. 992 (1925), noted in 10 Minn. L. R. 168 and 7 Tenn. L. Rev.
142; Slayton v. Singleton, 72 Tex. 209, 9 S. W. 876 (1888).
See also Stelges v.
Simmons, 170 N. C. 42, 86 S. E. 801 (1915) (estoppel) ; Hadden v. Stevens, 181
Ga. 165, 181 S. E. 767 (1935) (estoppel) ; Hayes v. Simmons, 136 Okla. 206, 277
P. 213 (1929) (laches).
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The importance of a prior administration is made apparent by the
case of Simpson v. Cornish." Following an express adjudication of intestacy and a final decree of distribution specifically allotting realty, the
heirs in that case conveyed to good faith purchasers. The court said, in
protecting the vendees from the effect of a subsequent probate of decedent's will, "We believe it is the law that a bona fide purchaser who
relies upon official acts of a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter will be protected in his title and in his purchase, for if it were not
so, the courts, representing the judicial system, would be instrumental
in committing a fraud, to the great detriment of one who relies upon
its order or decree . . . the distinction [between a purchaser from a
devisee after probate of a will and a purchase made from an heir after
an adjudication of intestacy] is not based upon a difference in principle.
While, in case of testacy, reliance is placed by the purchaser on the order or decree of probate admitting the will, in the case of intestacy reliance is placed, as in the instant case, upon the adjudication of intestacy.
In either case, the purchaser is protected, because he relied upon a judi'
cial determination of a court of competent jurisdiction. 7
Protection is given to the title of the vendee acquired subsequent to
intestacy administration proceedings because of the fear that the opposite
conclusion would result in clouds on title derived from an heir, impairment of marketability and sale value, and, in effect, would create restraints on alienation. These fears were voiced by the Wisconsin court
concerned with the Simpson case for it said: "To hold that a bona fide
purchaser . . . cannot rely upon an adjudication of intestacy or upon
a final decree, would have a tendency . . . to suspend the power of
alienation . . . If the rule contended for . . . be adopted by the
court . . . then the title to all property passing under the intestate
laws of this state may be involved under a cloud which will effectually
restrict its alienation and which will vitally effect the value of the real
estate."" This argument bears considerable weight, for the free transfer
of inherited realty might well be impeded if a possible revocation of probate were to hang, like the sword of Damocles, over the purchaser's title.
6 Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 218 N. W. 193 (1928), Rosenberry, J., dissented, noted in 14 Iowa L. Rev. 111, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 118, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 768
and 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 142-See also Dodd v. Holden, 205 Ark. 817, 171 S.W. (2d)
948 (1943), Robbins, J., wrote a dissenting opinion; First National Bank of Portland v. Connolly, 172 Ore. 434, 138 P. (2d) 613 (1943), rehearing denied 172 Ore.
434, 143 P. (2d) 243 (1943) (dictum).
7 196 Wis. 125 at 151-2, 218 N. W. 193 at 203. The action was one brought by
devisees after probate to remove a cloud from title.
8 Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 218 N. E. 193 (1928).
9 196 Wis. 125 at 154, 218 N. W. 193 at 204.
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It cannot be denied that the result reached may work hardship on
the isolated devisee normally entitled to the property, but this is lessened
by the fact that he may pursue the purchase price into the vendor's
hands."0 Also, the normal administration proceedings take long enough
to give him a fair opportunity to make a search into the fact situation
before the administration of the estate is closed.
In many jurisdictions this problem can be solved by resort to statutes. A few of these enactments have direct application while others bear
only indirectly on the issue. In some states there are express statutes
granting specific protection to the purchaser from an heir subsequent to
the death of his ancestor. 1 These have application either with or without prior intestacy administration proceedings. In substance, these statutes provide that the title of a bona fide purchaser of realty from the
heirs of a person who died seized thereof is not affected by a devise of the
property made by the latter unless, within a certain period of time after
his death, the will devising the property is admitted to probate or duly
established by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. Then
if the will is not probated within the statutory period, the rights of the
devisees, under the subsequently probated will, are limited to the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the adverse heirs. There is an implication
which arises from the mere fact of the existence of these express statutory
protective devices and that is that there has been a legislative attempt to
grant advantages to and balance the equities between the unhappy devisees and bona fide purchasers who find themselves in the unfortunate
12
situation discussed herein.
10 In re Walker's Estate, 160 Cal. 547, 117 P. 510, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 89 (1911);
Thompson v. Sampson, 64 Cal. 330, 30 P. 980 (1883), McKinstry, Sharpstein, and
McKee, JJ., dissented.
11 See, for example, McKinney's Cons. Laws N. Y., Decedent Estate Law, § 46:
"The title of a purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, from the
heir of a person who died seized of real property, shall not be affected by a devise
of the property made by the latter, unless within two years after the testator's
death, the will devising the same is either admitted to probate and recorded as a
will of real property in the office of the surrogate having jurisdiction, or established
by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction of the state, In an action
brought for that purpose." The statute, like most statutes of limitation, contains
certain saving clauses favoring minors, non-residents and the like. It was derived
from original § 2628, Code of Civil Procedure, which had a four year limitation.
Cases illustrating the application of this section are: Gilkinson v. Miller, 74 F. 131
(1896) ; Fox v. Fee, 167 N. Y. 44, 60 N. E. 281 (1901) affirming 33 App. Div. 627,
53 N. Y. S. 1103 (1898) in turn affirming 24 App. Div. 314, 49 N. Y. S. 292 (1897) ;
Cole v. Gourlay, 79 N. Y. 527 (1880) ; Cipperly v. Link, 135 Misc. 134, 237 N. Y. S.
106 (1929) (bar limited to title acquired from heir) ; Werner v. Wheeler, 142 App.
Div. 358, 127 N. Y. S. 158 (1911).
12 Cases illustrating the application of similar statutes found in other jurisdictions may be observed in Biggs v. McCarthy, 86 Ind. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 320 (1882) ;
Markley v. Kramer, 66 Kan. 664, 72 P. 221 (1903) ; Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N. C.
563, 101 S. E. 218 (1919) ; Cooley v. Lee, 170 N. C. 18, 86 S. E. 720 (1915) (question
of retrospective application) ; Crickenberger v. Jasper, 105 W. Va. 638, 144 S. E.
576 (1928). See also 57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 786; 26 C. J. S., Descent and Distribution,
§ 78.
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Among the enactments which indirectly protect the purchaser are
those which have either placed an absolute limitation on the time within
which a will may be probated or that the probate of a will is of no effect
unless filed for probate within a given period. Therefore, if the will is
not probated within the time allotted the purchaser would automatically
become protected."
Recordation statutes have also played their part in sustaining or
denying the claim of the devisee. For instance, where there has been an
intentional and fraudulent or negligent omission to record the prior
probate of a foreign will in the county in which the land is located, or an
improper recordation of a valid domestic or foreign will prior to a conveyance by the heirs either with or without intestacy administration proceedings,1" the grantee has been protected.
In the light of these judicial determinations from other jurisdictions,
the legal basis for the decision rendered upon the facts and circumstances
in the principal case appears to be the most reasonable and logical conclusion that could be reached. It establishes stability of title to realty,
creates a guide post for the attorney, and sounds a warning to testators
that if the persons whom they desire to be the beneficiaries of their
generosity are to receive the property intended instead of litigation such
testators should overcome their inherent dislike to notify the world that
they have made a will and should provide for a safe-keeping deposit
thereof in a location known to all within their immediate circle. When
the innocent vendee has examined the public records and purchased in
reliance on the devolution of title as shown therein, the Illinois court,
in the absence of express legislation, has given the unqualified answer to
the unspoken question of "what more can he do?" by answering "nothing, no more is needed."
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13 Goodman v. Russ, 14 Conn. 210 (1841); Ryan v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 64
Tex. 239 (1885) ; Ochoa v. Miller, 59 Tex. 460 (1883). local statutes contain innumerable differences, hence should be individually examined. Kentucky has construed its ten year statute of limitation for relief not otherwise limited as applicable
on the right to offer a will for probate; Foster v. Jordan, 130 Ky. 445, 113 S. W. 490
(1908); Reid's Adm'r v. Benge, 112 Ky. 810, 66 S. W. 997, 57 L. R. A. 253, 99 Am.
St. Rep. 334 (1902) (in an action brought by devisees to probate an after-discovered
will against purchaser from an heir without prior intestacy administration) following Allan v. Froman, 96 Ky. 313, 28 S. W. 497 (1894) (on right to probate a
foreign will).
14 Catholic University of America v. Boyd, 227 Ill. 281, 81 N. E. 363 (1907) ; Bliss
v. Seeley, 191 Ill. 461, 61 N. E. 524 (1901) ; Harrison v. Weatherby, 180 Ill. 418,
54 N. E. 237 (1899) ; Barnes v. Gunter, 111 Minn. 383, 127 N. W. 398 (1910) ; Mizell
v. Osmon, 354 Mo. 321, 189 S. W. (2d) 306 (1945) ; McCulloch's Lessee v. Eudaly,
3 Yerg. (11 Tenn.) 346 (1832); Slayton v. Singleton, 72 Tex. 209, 9 S. W. 876
(1888) ; Chadwick v. Turner, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 310, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 349, 12 Jur.
N. S. 239, 14 L. T. N. S. 86, 14 Week. Rep. 491 (1866).
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ALLOWANCES

TO SURVIVING

WIFE,

HUSBAND, OR CHILD-WHETHER OR NOT A WIDOW is ENTITLED TO A FULL
AWARD WHEN SHE DIES PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTORY
SUPPORT PERIOD AND

BEFORE THE AWARD HAS

BEEN GRANTED--Among

recent decisions dealing with the administration of decedents' estates, the
opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Croke's Estate v.

Clancy' is of importance. The case offered the court its first opportunity
to consider the extent of a widow's entitlement, under the local widow's
allowance statute, 2 when she died three months after her husband and
before any allowance had been set aside for her benefit by the appraisers.
The allowance, when subsequently made, was objected to by the widow's
executrix since it was apparently limited to that period during which the
widow had survived her husband. 3 The executrix claimed that the amount
so set aside was, and would have been, insufficient to support her decedent
for the entire statutory period. She therefore moved for an increase to
an amount equivalent to that payable for a full year. The Probate Court
so held, but the Court of Appeals, looking to the purpose of the statute,
reversed and reinstated the sum originally granted. In arriving at that
conclusion, the court pointed out that the statute was not intended to provide a gratuity or a distributive share in the husband's estate, but that
its sole province was to extend the husband's duty of support for one
year beyond the date of his death. By adopting this position, the court
refused to be persuaded by the argument that support for the entire
year indefeasably vested in the surviving widow on the death of the
husband.4
Statutes directing some form of allowance to the widow to alleviate
the economic distress likely to prevail upon the death of the husband and
during the period of administration are purely American in origin., Such
1- Ohio App. -, 93 N. E. (2d) 799 (1950). Hurd, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
2 Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1946, § 10509-74, provides: "The appraisers shall set
off and allow to the widow . . . sufficient provisions or other property to support
[her] for twelve months from the decedent's death ... The probate judge shall have
authority to fix the year's allowance if the appraisers fail to do so, or if for any
other reason there is no appraisal."
3 The action was brought pursuant to Page's Ohio Gen. Code 1946, § 10509-77,
which permits the widow or other interested person to petition for a review of the
allowance and authorizes the probate judge to take discretionary action in the
matter.
4 The court, by way of dictum, indicated that if the appraisers had set aside an
allowance for a full year the same result would have been reached upon proper
motion by the husband's personal representative to reduce the allowance.
5 See Woerner, The Law of American Administration (Little, Brown & Co., New
York, 1899), 2d Ed., § 77. These statutes would stem from an early date according
to Atchison, "Massachusetts Probate System," 42 Mich. L. Rev. 425 (1943), particularly pp. 427-8.
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statutes undoubtedly owe their existence to a benevolent and humane legislative spirit as well as to a recognition by the State of its duty to protect the family in time of need.6 But the legislation now to be found in
all of the American states would appear to have well defined local characteristics for each state seems to have preferred to treat the problem
in its own fashion. According to one writer,7 this provincial attitude has
given rise to a hodge-podge of legislation which is often ambiguous and
difficult to apply. One of the more apparent difficulties concerns that
which faced the court in the instant case for the contingency of the
widow's death before the receipt of the award does not appear to have
been contemplated nor covered by express language in any of these statutes.
It might be emphasized, at the outset, that the prior cases which
have dealt with the particular problem defy any comprehensive classification because of the facility with which the several statutes may be
distinguished. 8 Notwithstanding this circumstance, certain standards of
construction seem to have been formulated which might serve to give some
aid to the interpretation to be given to any particular statute whenever
the problem here presented should arise.
When heretofore confronted with the question, the fundamental inquiry of the courts has been to determine whether or not the allowance
could be said to have vested at or prior to the time of the widow's death.
On this basis, some courts have concluded that the entire allowance is defeated where the statute requires a judicial determination of the amount
to be received by the widow and judicial action has not been taken during the widow's lifetime.9 That result appears dictated whenever there
are discretionary features to the statute which render it impossible to
confer definite property rights on the widow until determination has been
made. It has also been held that the allowance cannot be declared vested
where the statute requires the widow to perform some affirmative act as a
6

Ibid.

7 Vernier, American Family Laws

fornia, 1935), Vol. 3, § 228.

(Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cali-

The author has compiled the various statutes on the

subject at the place cited.
8 This thought is expressed in an annotation, to be found in 144 A. L. R. 270, to
the case of Re Sampson, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N. W. (2d) 60 (1942).
9 Zunkel v. Colson, 109 Iowa 695, 81 N. W. 175 (1899) ; Drew v. Gordon, 95 Mass.
(13 Allen) 120 (1866) ; Adams v. Adams, 51 Mass. (10 Metc.) 170 (1845); Tarbox
v. Fisher, 50 Me. 236 (1836) ; Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R. I. 259, 14 A. (2d) 508
(1940) ; State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 23 Wash. (2d) 250, 160 P. (2d) 606
(1945).
See also 24 C. J. Executors and Administrators, § 824, p. 258, and 34
C. J. S., Executors and Administrators, § 348, p. 55. In Ex Parte Dunn, 63 N. C.
137 (1868), a judicial confirmation of the proposed set off by the appraisers was
said to be a necessary pre-requisite to vesting.
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prerequisite to obtaining the allowance. 10 In that category fall those statutes which require the widow to select the property which is to constitute
The rationale for this
the allowance 1 or to make application for it."
view rests on the proposition that the act so required is one personal to the
widow and must be made choate by her while still living, otherwise the
1"
right to the allowance will be deemed to be waived.
Conversely, a number of decisions have concluded that, as the statute in question vested the allowance in the widow immediately on the
death of her husband, the claim to the award was capable of surviving, in
its entirety, to the widow's personal representative upon the widow's
death." The vesting feature of such statutes has been said to be demon' 5
or
strated by6 the presence of a granting clause which "entitles"'
"allows"'
the widow to have a fixed amount of property upon her husband's death. Other instances of vestiture occur where the allowance
10 Henderson, Adm'r v. Tucker, 70 Ala. 381 (1881) ; Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark.
118, 161 S. W. (2d) 8 (1942) ; Zunkel v. Colson, 109 Iowa 695, 81 N. W. 175 (1899) ;
In re Bayer's Estate, 95 Neb. 488, 145 N. W. 1030 (1914) ; Carey v. Monroe, 54 N. J.
Eq. 632, 35 A. 456 (1896) ; Kimball v. Deming, 27 N. C. (5 Ired.) 418 (1845) ; Cox
v. Brown, 27 N. C. (5 Ired.) 194 (1844) ; Kearn's Appeal, 120 Pa. 523, 14 A. 435
(1888) ; In re Hemphill's Estate, 157 Wis. 331, 147 N. W. 1089 (1914).
11 Henderson, Adm'r v. Tucker, 70 Ala. 381 (1881) ; Carey v. Monroe, 54 N. J. Eq.
632, 35 A. 456 (1896) ; In re Hemphill's Estate, 157 Wis. 331, 147 N. W. 1089 (1914).
12 Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 161 S. W. (2d) 8 (1942) ; Zunkel v. Colson, 109
Iowa 695, 81 N. W. 175 (1899) ; In re Bayer's Estate, 95 Neb. 488, 145 N. W. 1030
(1914) ; Kimball v. Deming, 27 N. C. (5 Ired.) 418 (1845) ; Cox v. Brown, 27 N. C.
(5 Ired.) 194 (1844) ; Kearn's Appeal, 120 Pa. 523, 14 A. 435 (1888).
13 See In re Bayer's Estate, 95 Neb. 488, 145 N. W. 1030 (1914) ; Kearn's Appeal,
120 Pa. 523, 14 A. 435 (1888). Another segment of this rationale is exemplified in
Re Sampson, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N. W. (2d) 60, 144 At L R. 264 (1942). It was there
held that the action to compel an award was personal to the widow, hence was not
capable of surviving according to the common law, and there was no statutory
sanction for its enforcement after the widow's death.
14 In re Hearn's Estate, 22 Del. Ch. 447, 195 A. 367 (1937) ; Brown v. Joiner, 77
Ga. 232, 3 S. E. 157 (1887) ; York v. York, 38 Ill. 522 (1865) ; Bratney v. Curry, 33
Ind. 399 (1870) ; Mallory v. Mallory, 92 Ky. 316, 17 S. W. 737 (1891) ; Pyles v.
Bowie, 123 Md. 13, 90 A. 772 (1914) ; In re Poupore's Estate, 132 Minn. 409, 157
N. W. 648 (1916); Sammons v. Higbie, 103 Minn. 448, 115 N. W. 265 (1908);
Hastings v. Myer, 21 Mo. 519 (1855) ; Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo. App.
91, 89 S. W. (2d) 153 (1936) ; Crawford v. Nassoy, 173 N. Y. 163, 65 N. E. 962
(1903) ; In re Warner's Estate, 53 App. Div. 565, 65 N. Y. S. 1022 (1900) ; In re
Ackler's Estate, 168 Misc. 623, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 128 (1938) ; In re Hulse, 41 Misc. 307,
84 N. Y. S. 220 (1903) ; In re Estate of Phillips, 27 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 142 (1928) ;
In re James' Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N.. W. 525 (1916); Estate of Johnson, 41

Vt. 467 (1868).

Where the widow, not having received her allowance, does not die

until after the expiration of the statutory support period, there seems to be no

question but what the award is a vested one:

In re Rice's Estate, 146 Iowa 48,

124 N. W. 792 (1910) ; Bane v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 631 (1863).
15 In re Hearn's Estate, 22 Del. Ch. 447, 195 A. 367 (1937) ; Pyles v. Bowie, 123
Md. 13, 90 A. 772 (1914) ; Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo. App. 91, 89 S. W.
(2d) 153 (1936).
16 York v. York, 38 Ill. 522 (1865) ; Sammons v. Higbie, 103 Minn. 448, 115 N. W.
265 (1908) ; In re James' Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 (1916).
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may be said to "belong" to the widow, 7 or where the property which
comprises the award is to be excluded from the assets of the husband's
estate.18
In the cases reviewed to this point, the allowance was either granted
or denied in its entirety regardless of the length of time within which the
widow survived her husband. The principal case must be regarded as
novel in that it took a middle ground by directing a proration of the
allowance measured according to the length of time the widow survived in
relation to the one-year statutory support period. 19 The divergence between this result and that reached by other courts, in cases where a similar
discretionary sum has been involved, seems to rest upon the fact that
the support feature of the Ohio statute was emphasized, making it unnecessary for the court to enter upon an investigation of the vesting question.
In the cases which turn on the point of whether the award was vested
or not, it may be noted there has been an inclination to treat the allowance
as a gratuity rather than a provision for support. 20 An added reason for
proration of the allowance in the instant case might be said to exist in the
fact that the Ohio statute fixed a statutory period for support which
made it possible accurately to measure the sum to which the widow would
be entitled for those months during which she did survive. No such
possibility of measurement appears under other statutes where the amount
of the allowance is made to depend upon a judicial determination.
What the particular outcome of the instant problem would be in
Illinois, if it should arise, is not clear, since the prevailing statute21 does
not indicate the course to be followed and no Illinois case to date has
provided any construction thereof. The statute presently provides that
the widow is to be allowed, as her own property, 2 2 certain chattels 2' and,
in addition, a sum of money which the appraisers shall deem to be reasonable 24 to support her for the nine-month period following her husband's
17 Crawford v. Nassoy, 173 N. Y. 163, 65 N. E. 962 (1903).
's In re Ackler's Estate, 168 Misc. 623, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 128 (1938) ; In re Estate
of Phillips, 27 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 142 (1928). The statute concerned in the case
of In Estate of Johnson, 41 Vt. 467 (1868), provided that the widow should "have"
the award.
19 But see In re Rice's Estate, 146 Iowa 48, 124 N. W. 792 (1910).
20 An exception to this view may be seen in Adams v. Adams, 51 Mass. (10 Mete.)
170 (1845), where the court gave credence to the "support" theory but denied recovery because the award had not "vested."
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 330 et seq.
22 This thought has been expressed in various forms. The phrase "sole and separate" was used in Laws 1845, p. 38, § 1. It was amended to read "sole and exclusive"
by Laws 1847, p. 168, § 1. The latter phrase was retained until the present term
"own" appeared in Laws 1939, p. 4, § 178.
23 These chattels consist of the family pictures and the wearing apparel, jewels
and ornaments of the widow.
24 The reasonableness of the sum is to be determined by a consideration of the

LAW REVIEW

CHICAGO-KENTT

death, but which sum of money shall not be less than $1,000. It may be
seen that this statute contains, in combination, many factors which have
been deemed to be singularly controlling in prior cases considered elsewhere. The Illinois statute, therefore, being much more complex, may be
productive of a mixed result.
Some assistance may be provided by the holding in the early Illinois
case of York's Administrator v. York's Administrator,25 interpreting a
former statute, wherein it was decided that the specific articles which
went to make up the award 26 vested absolutely in the widow immediately
upon her husband's death, notwithstanding the fact that she died ten
days later and prior to a set-off by the appraisers. The statute then in
effect 2" provided that the widow was entitled to have certain specific
articles and also other property of an unascertainable nature2 8 as and for
her sole exclusive property. In arriving at this decision the court said,
"The language of the act is emphatic, and declares in the most express
terms, that the specific articles

.

.

.

shall be the sole and exclusive

property of the widow forever. "29 This case, and others previously noted,3"
should stand as good authority for the proposition that the fixed items
designated in the present award statute, to-wit: the chattels and the
minimum $1,000 allowance, should be deemed to vest in the widow on the
death of her spouse"' for "own," as presently used, does not differ in
legal effect from the phrase "sole and exclusive" heretofore used.2 2 The
case is not, however, completely satisfactory for present purposes because there is no clear indication therein concerning a disposition toward
the discretionary features included in the award.22 The question of choice
condition in life of the widow when taken in relation to the condition of the estate.
The award may be payable in installments every three months for the nine-month
period following the husband's death.
2538 Ill. 522 (1865).
26 Even then the award was provisional in nature, for the widow had an option
to take the estimated worth of the articles in cash or in other property.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1845, § 48, p. 546, as amended by Laws 1845, p. 38, § 1, and Laws
1847, p. 168, § 1.
28 The pioneer character of the times may have been reflected in the fact that
this property was said to consist of the necessary beds, furniture, stove and stove
pipe, yearly provisions, livestock feed for six months, and fuel for three months.
Not only was the property unascertainable before set off but an element of time
was interposed.
522 at 525.
29 38 Il.
30 Comparable cases from other jurisdictions are listed in note 14, ante.
31 There is dicta to that effect in McCord v. McKinley, 92 Ill. 11 (1879) ; Allen
v. Hempstead, 154 Ill. App. 91 (1910) ; Fick v. Armstrong, 136 Ill. App. 28 (1907) ;
Ross v. Smith, 47 Ill. App. 197 (1892) ; In re Estate of Scoville, 20 Ill. App. 426
See also Horner, Probate Practice (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1925), 3d
(1W86).
Ed., § 83; Simons, Probate Practice (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1907), § 495.
32 See Prete v. Finkelstein, 193 Misc. 24, 83 N. Y. S. (2d) 353 (1948).
33 A criticism of this deficiency, expressed by Levi North, author of North's Probate Practice, appears in a note appended to the report of the decision in York v.
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among the three possible results, heretofore illustrated, that could be
achieved with regard to that part of the monetary award which exceeds
the minimum amount, still, therefore, remains undetermined.
Notice has already been taken of the fact that there is support for
the general proposition that an unascertained portion of an award cannot34
be said to vest until a determination with regard thereto has been made.
The possibility is not remote that Illinois might adopt this attitude and
deny all chance of recovery as to this part of the award for the theory
followed in other jurisdictions could apply, with equal vigor, to the
Illinois statute. 5 One important consideration may mitigate against such
a result and that is the fact that the statute has received extremely liberal
treatment at the hands of earlier Illinois courts.3 6 If that same liberality
prevails, it is unlikely that such a harsh course would be followed, especially since the other two possible approaches lead to less severe consequences.
One such approach concerns itself with the unique result of proration
attained by the Ohio court in the instant case. A similar result is possible
in Illinois for there is comparable language in the two statutes as well
as machinery in the form of a fixed support period through which an
accurate proration could be achieved. 7 The analogy tends to lose some
of its persuasiveness when it is recognized that the Ohio statute lacks
a granting clause as explicit as that to be found in the Illinois act,

8

but

application of the analogy would put emphasis on the idea of support,
York, 38 111. 522, as the same appears in the Denslow reprint, made in 1877, of that
volume of the Illinois Reports. See also Boyer v. Boyer, 21 Ill. App. 534 (1886),
where it was held that the appraisers were not permitted to estimate the worth of
certain of these discretionary articles.
34 See cases cited in note 9, ante.
35 Proponents of this view should not overlook the case of Estate of Johnson, 41
Vt. 467 (1868). The statute there concerned provided that the widow should have
so much of the personal estate of her husband as the probate court might assign
to her according to circumstances and degree, but in no case was the share to be
less than one-third of the estate after debts. The court, in a case where the widow
had died one month after her husband without receiving any part of such contemplated allowance, held that her personal representative was entitled to at least a
one-third share since that sum had vested in her on the death of her husband.
36 In particular, see Gillett v. Gillett, 207 Ill. 136, 69 N. E. 942 (1904), affirming
109 Ill. App. 126 (1903) ; Strawn v. Strawn, 53 Ill. 263 (1870) ; Moss v. Moss, 208
Ill. App. 589 (1917).
37 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 330, which provides for " ...
such
sum of money as the appraisers deem reasonable for the proper support of the surviving spouse . . . for nine months after the death of the decedent," with Page's
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1946, § 10509-74, which directs that the appraisers "shall set
off and allow to the widow . . . sufficient provisions or other property to support
[her] for twelve months from the decedent's death . . ."
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 330, provides that the widow shall be allowed,
"as her own property," that property which constituted the award. In contrast, the
Ohio provision is.contained in an entirely different section, to-wit: Page's Ohio Gen.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

a necessary element to the Ohio decision, whereas a contrary view would
give to the Illinois statute a sense of gratuity over-riding the phrase which
reveals a purpose to provide for the "proper support" of the widow.
Certainly, her need for "support" would be contemporaneous only with
her lifetime and no longer.
The other possible construction of the Illinois act would automatically
vest the entire allowance, minimum and discretionary, in the widow upon
the death of her husband regardless of when she died. Such a construction would give the utmost liberality to the statute and would emphasize
the idea that the granting clause is definitive as to the entire award.
Stated differently, the word "own" as employed in the statute, would
apply to all segments of the award, the unascertained as well as the
ascertained. This view finds support in the Georgia case of Brown, Administrator v. Joiner, Administrator.9 It reached the conclusion that the
statute under consideration vested the unascertained portion of the allowance in the widow immediately on the death of her husband inasmuch as
it imposed an absolute duty on the appraisers to set off this reasonable
sum for her yearly support, even though the widow might, as in fact
she did, die within the twelve month period without having received the
allowance. It was pointed out that the appraisers were precluded from
taking into consideration the time of the widow's death, for the statute
made it their sole duty to determine the reasonableness of the sum intended for her support for one year. The Illinois statute is susceptible
of much the same construction. Although the appraisers have other
duties to perform, their service in relation to the widow's award is limited
to a determination of the reasonableness of the amount to be granted
and no more.
The foregoing discussion may have served to highlight the problem
and furnish possible alternatives for its solution even if it has not attempted the impossible by way of providing a forecast of the precise
action which an Illinois court will take when forced to achieve a decision.
As certain recent revisions of the statute call for clarifying amendment, 40
it can only be suggested that the legislature should consider the whole
situation and all of its possibilities, when it next considers the subject.
A. S. GREENE
Code Ann. 1946, § 10509-54, as amended, which excludes certain assets from the
husband's estate for the benefit of the widow. Even if this section and Section
10509-74 were construed in pan materia, they would still lack the comprehensibility
of the Illinois granting clause.
89 77 Ga. 232, 3 S. E. 157 (1887).
40 An amendment adopted in 1949 was intended to put both spouses on an equal
plane: Laws 1949, p; 1, § 1. It has, however, produced a need for clarification
because certain parts of the statute still refer only to widows and might be said to
be inapplicable to widowers.
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COSTs-TAxATION-WHETHER

COSTS

INCURRED

IN

ORDER

TO

OVER-

COME DEFENSES NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH MAY BE TAXED AT AN EX-PARTE

HEAxRNG--Little use appears to have been made of Section 41 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act,1 if absence of appellate records may be considered to be any indication of infrequent trial court practice, although
a judge once offered the opinion that the imposition of penalties under
the statute would soon cause untrue defenses to disappear. 2 The decision
in Adams v. Silfen3 indicates that it would be improper to assess costs
for an untruthful defense, if one should be offered, except at the time
of the trial and then only after proper notice of an intention to make
application for an award. The plaintiff there, on petition filed long after
the hearing and at an ex parte hearing before another judge than the
one who presided at the trial, secured an order taxing the defendant with
certain costs and attorney's fees allegedly incurred in overcoming certain
allegations and denials made by the defendant supposedly without reasonable cause, not in good faith, and found to be untrue.'
The Appellate
Court for the First District reversed such order on the ground that the
statute was penal in character and no recovery could be permitted under
it except upon full compliance with its terms. Although the section
calls for a "summary" taxation of costs, it was said not to warrant ex
parte action but rather to require that an opportunity be provided to
be heard on the question of whether costs should be taxed or not. It
was also said that the power to tax costs was vested in the trial judge
alone since only he would possess the knowledge necessary to permit of
summary disposition of the matter. The utility of the provision would
seem to be a matter of some doubt unless it could be said to possess some
prophylactic value from its mere presence on the statute book.
1 11. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 165.

2 Fisher, "The Persistence of Chitty," 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1939), particularly
p. 372.
3 342 Ill. App. 415, 96 N. E. (2d) 628 (1951).
4 Other cases interpreting the statute may be found in Hausman Steel Co. v. N. P.
Severin Co., 316 Ill. App. 585, 45 N. E. (2d) 552 (1942), and Palmer v. Gillarde, 312
Ill. App. 230, 38 N. E. (2d) 352 (1942), but to date there has been no recorded case
in which a penalty under the statute has been successfully imposed. It should be
noted that the permissible recovery is described as the "reasonable expenses" of the
opposite party. Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno., 1933, pp. 87-8, suggests this phrase may
include attorneys' fees. There has been no expression to date interpreting this
aspect of the statute.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-PROCEEDINGS--WHETHER

OR NOT TIME FOR

APPEAL IN A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROCEEDING IS TO BE MEASURED BY

LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RULE--The Illinois Supreme Court
granted leave to appeal in Freeport Motor Casualty Company v. Tharp'
solely to settle a question as to the timeliness of an appeal from a declaratory judgment order entered pursuant to the recently enacted declaratory
judgment statute. 2 The proceeding had been one to secure a declaration
as to an insurance company's obligations under a public liability policy.
APPLICABLE

The trial judge, being absent from the county, mailed a written judgment
order, under date of June 15th, to the clerk of the court with direction
to make the usual docket entry "the next day there is court in Louisville,"
that place being the county seat. The order was received by the clerk of
ws not
nobt speadof
ecor uni
Jne
Juie 16th butJune-16h
was
spread of record
until June

41th,
the
next court
4
t

day. Notice of appeal was filed on September 22nd, well within the ninetyday period 3 measured from June 24th but more than the statutory time
allowed if the order could be said to have been entered on June 16th.
The Appellate Court had rejected a motion to dismiss the appeal and
had disposed of the case on the merits. The Supreme Court agreed that
such action had been proper.
It is clear that the commencement of the period for appeal varies
depending on the nature of the action brought, for a law judgment becomes
4
final the moment it is pronounced even though not recorded until later,
whereas an equity decree attains the force of a binding decree for this
purpose only after it has been signed and enrolled.- Inasmuch as a declaratory judgment proceeding is sui juris,6 it became necessary for the
court to determine the exact point when the period for appeal would
begin to run in such a case. In that regard, and for this purpose, the
court concluded that the declaratory judgment proceeding should take
the same character as would a suit based on the same facts but seeking
positive relief instead of a mere declaration of rights. As the instant
case appeared to be, in essence, a law action based on a contract, the court
1406 Il. 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 139 (1950), affirming 338 Ill. App. 593, 88 N. E. (2d)
499 (1949). Fulton, J., dissented.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 200, requires that no appeal, as a matter of right, shall be taken
"after the expiration of ninety days" from the "entry" of the order, decree or
judgment. It does not elaborate on the acts which constitute "entry."
4 People v. Jarecki, 352 Ill. 207, 185 N. E. 570 (1933).

Snook v. Shaw, 315 IIl. App. 594, 43 N. E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGOSee also Hughes v. Washington, 65 Ill. 245 (1872), and
Jones v. City of Carterville, 340 Il1. App. 330, 91 N. E. (2d) 604 (1950).
6 Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 79 N. E. (2d) 516 (1948) ; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Vince, 118 F. (2d) 232 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 637, 62 S. Ct.
71, 86 L. Ed. 511 (1941).
5
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applied legal rather than equitable concepts to fix the time for appeal.7
The holding may be indicative of a line of thought to be applied with
regard to other procedural problems which may arise in declaratory
judgment matters. 8
The court did, however, note that the statute fixes a period which
commences with the "entry" of the judgment rather than with its rendition. If a law judge pronounces judgment while present in open court
in the county in which the case is pending and at a time when the court
is in full and proper session, the appeal period, following the law rule,
would immediately begin to run as the ministerial act of "entering" the
judgment would be presumed to have occurred contemporaneously with
the rendition of the judgment. If, on the other hand, as in the instant
case, the judge is elsewhere at the time he formulates his decision and
sends the same in by mail, there is no judgment until he, or an appropriate
substitute, returns and reconvenes the court into proper session at the
proper place. On that basis, the court held the final judgment in the
instant case had not been "entered" until June 24th, for which reason
the motion to dismiss the appeal had, properly, been denied.
DIVORCE--ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTYWHETHER OR NOT RETROACTIVE EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE STATUTORY AMENDMENT DESIGNED TO PRESERVE LUMP-Sum SETTLEMENTS FROM
THE CONSEQUENCE OF REMARRIAGE--In the recent case of Walters v. Walters,' the plaintiff, in 1946, had been awarded a divorce under a decree
which contained a provision for the payment of a specified sum of money
in installments. Later that year, the defendant filed a petition for modification of the decree in the form of cancellation of the obligation to make
The trial court
the payments because of the plaintiff's remarriage.
granted the requested relief but the Appellate Court for the First District
reversed on the ground that the provision was in the nature of a lump7 The case had seemingly turned on a question as to the construction to be given
to the language contained in the policy. That aspect of the case is discussed in a
note to the decision of the Appellate Court to be found in 29 CmCAGo-KENT LAw
REvIEw 18-9. Presumably, if the declaratory judgment proceeding had sought a
determination as to the company's freedom from liability because of fraud or mistake, the action would have possessed the character of a suit in equity for rescission
or reformation.
8 The statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1, recognizes the possibility
for differentiation among types of declaratory judgment proceedings for it calls for
trial by jury of disputed issues of fact where such method of determination is
customary. Pleading and other procedural questions may turn on the distinction
made in the instant case.
1341 Ill. App. 561, 94 N. E. (2d) 726 (1949). Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a concurring
opinion. Feinberg, J., dissented.
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sum settlement, 2 even though payable in installments, rather than one
for alimony. The plaintiff was, therefore, held entitled to the continued
receipt of the sums even though her marital status had been altered.
The decision is in conformity with the spirit of the 1949 amendment to
Section 18 of the Divorce Act,3 which provision now requires the continuation of payment, despite remarriage of the recipient, of any lump-sum
settlement, including those payable in installments. That amendment was,
in all probability, enacted to prevent the recurrence of decisions, such as
had been reached by certain of the Appellate Courts, to the effect that
such settlements, if payable in installments, were converted into and
were to be treated as alimony.4 The majority of the court mentioned,
but declined to apply, the amended section on the basis that it was unnecessary to do so. Taking this position, it found it unnecessary to consider whether the amendment possessed retroactive effect. Judge Niemeyer,
in his concurring opinion, felt the court should have stressed the statute
to bolster its decision.5
The significance of the position taken in the concurring opinion could
the more readily be grasped if one would consider that it could conceivably affect innumerable divorce decrees entered before the passage
of the 1949 amendment. Just such a situation existed in another recent
case, that of Coleman v. Coleman.' The facts therein parallelled those of
the Walters case in that the decree and the petition for modification came
before the passage of the 1949 amendment, and the decree provided for
a settlement similar to the one described in that case. The Appellate
Court for the Fourth District, however, interpreted the decretal provision
as being one for alimony rather than a lump-sum settlement and ordered
a termination of payments on evidence of the wife's remarriage. In arriving at that decision, the court refused to give retroactive effect to the
1949 amendment. If it had done so, the result reached might well have
been different since it would then have been confronted with an express
legislative mandate designed to fit the situation presented to the court.
2 This conclusion was apparently based on two factors present in the decree,
to-wit: (1) the settlement was for a specific total sum; (2) any unpaid balance, in
event of the premature death of the ex-husband, was to be a charge against his
estate.
3 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
4 See, for example, Hotzfleld v. Hotzfleld, 336 Ill. App. 238, 83 N. E. (2d) 605
(1948); Banck v. Banck, 332 Ill. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944); Adler v.
Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940).
5 Since no legislative intent allowing retroactive application was shown, the conclusion is difficult to justify. For the necessity of such a showing, see Hathaway v.
Merchants' Loan & T. Co., 218 Ill. 580, 75 N. E. 1060 (1905) ; Gage v. Stewart, 127
Ill. 207, 19 N. E. 702 (1889).
6 341 Ill. App. 462, 94 N. E. (2d) 507 (1949).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE AND DisSOLUTION-WHETHER THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE TERMS OF ANNEXATION
IN

THE

INITIATING

ORDINANCE

VOIDS

THE ARRANGEMENT

EVEN THOUGH

THE VOTERS APPROVE THE ACTION-The councils of both the plaintiff city
and the defendant city, in the recent case of City of Nameoki v. Granite
City,1 passed ordinances authorizing special elections to determine whether
the former should be annexed to the latter. A majority of those casting
votes at each election approved the proposed action. The plaintiff city
thereafter commenced suit requesting an injunction to restrain the defendant and its officers from assuming control over the former's government, property and affairs. The complaint alleged that neither ordinance
specified the terms of the annexation, as is required by statute, 2 for which
reason the whole arrangement was void. The "terms" referred to were
those dealing with the disposition to be made of the annexed municipality's
property, debts, public facilities and the like. The trial court dismissed
the suit on motion and, upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court because
a franchise was involved, that decision was affirmed.'
The higher court took the position that the mere failure to recite the
terms of annexation in the ordinances did not void the action taken
since other sections of the statute could be looked to in order to provide
the missing information. It is true that the legislature, after outlining
two methods for annexation, had included a statement of the manner in
which the existing debts and facilities of the annexed municipality were
to be handled.4 Due to the physical arrangement of this particular portion
of the statute, 5 however, it might appear that these provisions are applicable only where annexation occurs by the second method, the one not
utilized in the instant case. There is further basis for differentiation in
the fact that the second manner of procedure does not allow the municipalities any opportunity to agree as to the terms for the election thereunder is to be ordered by the county court upon petition by the requisite
number of voters. It was held, however, that the sections referred to are
1408 Ill. 33, 95 N. E. (2d) 920 (1951).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 7-12.
3 The trial court decision may have rested on the proposition that plaintiff chose
the wrong remedy, having used a proceeding in equity rather than quo warranto,
permitted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 112, § 9(a). The Supreme Court, while
noting that equity does not take jurisdiction merely to inquire Into the legality of
an election deemed the remedy appropriate as property rights were involved:
Village of Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, 255 Ill. 190, 99 N. E. 388 (1912).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 7-15 to § 7-20 inclusive and §§ 7-35, 7-38,
7-39.
5 These provisions follow immediately upon the sections outlining the second
method of annexation.
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not restricted in their application to situations where the annexation
occurs through the intervention of the county court, but are equally
applicable to either method of annexation.6
NAMES--ASSUMED NAMES-WHETHER
WHO

HAS

FAILED

TO

COMPLY

WITH

OR NOT CONTRACT MADE BY ONE

STATUTE

REGULATING USE OF

ASSUMED NAME IS VALID AND ENFoRcIBLE--The

AN

plaintiff in Grody v.

Scalone,' conducting his business under the designation of "Modern Furnace Company," sought to recover a balaance allegedly due for the installation of a furnace in the defendant's residence. The answer admitted
the existence of the contract, denied the other items in the complaint, and
set up as an affirmative defense the fact that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with the registration requirements of the Illinois Assumed Name
Act.2 It was contended that since the plaintiff had violated the statute
he was not lawfully in business and therefore any agreement he had
entered into was unenforcible as being contrary to public policy. The
trial court sustained this argument and the case was taken directly to the
Supreme Court on a claim that the statute was unconstitutional. The
higher court circumvented the constitutional issue by holding that noncompliance with the statutory provisions regulating the use of assumed
names did not affect the enforcibility of contracts or obligations entered
into by persons otherwise subject to the regulation of the statute. An
identical result was reached, on similar facts, in the later Supreme
Court case of Cohen v. Lerhman.3 The court, in reaching its decision
in these two cases, found that no other result would be consistent with
legislative intent. It reasoned that, since the only penalty set out in the
statute is one designed to punish the violator by a fine or imprisonment,4
the legislature did not intend any other consequence to attach to a failure
to comply with the law. A contrary result which had been attained in
two prior Appellate Court decisions has thus been repudiated.5
6 It is to be noted that Section 7-15, having to do with the debts of the annexed
municipality, restricts its applicability to annexation on petition. As the other
sections are not so specifically restricted, the court reasonably concluded that they
were not subject to restraint but could, and did, apply to both types of proceeding.
1408 Ill. 61, 96 N. E. (2d) 97 (1950), noted in 39 111. B. J. 308.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq.
3 408 Ill. 155, 96 N. E. (2d) 528 (1951).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 8.
5 Mickelson v. Kolb, 337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted in 27
CHCAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 327. See also Franks v. Coront, 341 Il1. App. 137,
93 N. E. (2d) 157 (1950).
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TAXATION-LEACY, INHERITANCE, AND TRANSFER TAXES-WHETHER IT
IS PROPER TO DEDUCT A PRO-RATA SHARE OF ALL DEBTS AND EXPENSES FROM
THE

VALUE OF

PAYABLE

BY

LOCAL

PROPERTY

IN

COMPUTING

THE INHERITANCE

A NON-RESIDENT DECEDENT'S ESTATF--The case of In

TAX

Re

Geatty's Estate1 presented a problem which arose out of an ancillary
administration proceeding commenced in Illinois. The decedent, a resident of Maryland, died, leaving assets in both jurisdictions. The local
administrator filed an inheritance tax return, 2 listing the property subject
to the Illinois tax, and deducted from the gross value 42.55% of all the
debts payable out of the estate together with the expense of administering
it both in Illinois and Maryland. He proceeded on the theory that the
Illinois assets were 42.55% of all the property left and therefore should
bear that percentage of debts and expenses as far as the tax calculation
was concerned. The Attorney General objected to this method of computation and subsequently the estate filed an amended return wherein
only the Illinois debts and administration expenses were subtracted. However, in the latter was included the entire amount of the Federal Estate
Tax,' and once more the Attorney General took exception. The county
judge assessed the tax on the basis of the original return, and upon
appeal by the state to the county court 4 the order was affirmed. A
further appeal was perfected, this time directly to the Supreme Court as
a question of revenue was involved, and again the percentage deductions
were sustained.
In computing the inheritance tax in instances where the decedent
is a non-resident, one of two methods is typically utilized in ascertaining
the amount of the debts and expenses which are deductible. The first
allows only the subtraction of local debts and administrative expenditures, while the second, the one adopted in the principal case, permits
a pro-rata deduction of all such items without regard to their situs.1 In
choosing the latter as the appropriate rule to be followed, the Supreme
Court took into consideration the fact that the adoption of the former
would allow the estate to reduce the tax basis by the full amount of the
federal Estate Tax. This, it was reasoned, might result in duplicate deductions, the estate taking advantage of the federal tax twice: once in the
1408 Ill. 383, 97 N. E. (2d) 307 (1951), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 518.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375 et seq. The tax is calculated on the amount of property which
has a tax situs in the state minus debts and administration expenditures.
3 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the full amount of the federal Estate
Tax is deductible even though the decedent had been possessed of property in sister
states: People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861 (1927).
4 The Act provides for such procedure: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 385.
5 61 C. J., Taxation, § 2604.
2 This was in compliance with the state inheritance tax act,
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main administrative proceeding in Maryland, and once in the ancillary
proceeding in Illinois. The court felt that it was under a duty to attempt
to prevent this possibility.6
The Supreme Court did, however, foresee one difficulty which might
arise if the pro-rata method was used indiscriminately and without regard
to the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, if the local debts and
expenses were larger than the allowable pro-rata deductions, the result
would be what the court termed "indirect taxation." In effect, the state
would be receiving more than its share since the entire amount of the
debts and expenses which were proper incidents of this jurisdiction would
not be subtracted from the value of the property located within its boundaries.7 As the record in this particular case did not indicate that indirect taxation would occur, it was decided that there was no necessity to
design a solution for such a problem at this time.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT OF ACT ON OTHER STATUTORY OR
COMMON

LAW RIGHTS

oF

ACTION AND

DEFENSES-WHETHER

STATE

RE-

LINQUISHES RIGHT OF SUBROGATION BY OFFSETTING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AGAINST STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM BENEFITS-In the

recent case of Weaver v. Hodge,' it appeared that after the death of her

husband, a former employee of the State of Illinois who had been negligently killed in the course of his employment, the widow sought to collect
her claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act " and also under the
Illinois Retirement System Act.' Following determination of her claim
under each of these respective statutes, she received payment in full of
the workmen's compensation claim and payment of her entitlement under
the retirement system, but payment of the latter was reduced by a set-off
6Tbe extent to which this objective was attained depends upon the Maryland
method of computation. Thus, if that state did not apply pro-rata apportionment,
a degree of duplication in the deduction of the Federal Estate Tax would still occur.
The possibility of duplicate deductions did not deter the court from allowing the

subtraction of the entire federal tax in People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E.
861 (1927).

It is to be noted that the decedent in that case, unlike the one in the

present, was a resident of Illinois and the main administration of the estate
occurred here. Thus it is readily apparent that the entire tax expense had a direct
point of incidence in this jurisdiction whereas the same is not true in situations
involving non-resident decedents where only ancillary proceedings occur in this
state. It would, therefore, appear reasonable to suggest that the instant decision
will have no effect upon the established rule that the federal Estate Tax can be
deducted in its entirety where a resident decedent's estate is involved. See 39 Ill.
B. J. 518 at 519.
7 For a situation of this type involving a resident decedent, see Connell v. Crosby,
210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350 (1904).
1406 Ill. 537, 94 N. E. (2d) 297 (1950).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 215 et seq.
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of the amount paid under the workmen's compensation award.4 Thereafter, the administrator of the deceased employee secured a judgment in
an action against the tort-feasors responsible for the death and the proceeds of that judgment were paid to the Clerk of the court. Upon petition
to distribute these proceeds, the State of Illinois sought leave to intervene
and to enforce a lien to reimburse it for the unsatisfied remainder of the
award it had been forced to pay under the Workmen's Compensation
Act.5 The lower court denied such request and the state appealed directly
to the Supreme Court., That court decided that a proper interpretation
of the two statutes involved would necessarily lead to the result that the
governmental employer had made an election to utilize the payments it
had made under the Workmen's Compensation Act in order to reduce
the obligation created by the Retirement System Act. To permit the
state to then enforce a lien upon the wrongful death judgment would,
in effect, provide it with duplicate reimbursement. While the case dealt
only with an issue involving a public employer, it poses a nice question
as to whether or not the same result would follow if a private employer,
operating a pension or benefit fund, should become involved in a similar
situation.'

4 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 225, directs that any amounts provided for the benefit of
a dependent of a system member, whether under the provisions of the state Workmen's Compensation Act or the state Occupational Disease Act, shall be applied as
an off-set against the amount due for any accidental death benefit, the off-set to be

made in such manner as the retirement board may direct.

5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166, provides for a lien In favor of an
employer who has paid a workmen's compensation award.
6 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, authorizes a direct appeal where the state is a party.
7 See Campbell, "Subrogation Under Workmen's Compensation-Too Much or Too
Little," 18 CHicA~o-KF.NT LAw REviEw 225-47 (1940).
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William J. Bowe.
ville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1950. Pp. 92.

LIF'n INSURANCE AND ESTATE TAX PLANNING.

Nash-

There have been debates among the learned through the ages respecting the economic, sociological, and ethical impact of the "right"
to inherit property. Bentham was probably among the first to suggest that, providing there will be no impairment of productivity, the
maximum happiness of society would be realized by distributing wealth
equally. Only the years can reveal the degree of wisdom in such a
course, but apparently our present-day tax planners have chosen to ignore

the proviso clause of the aforementioned concept and have concentrated
on a simple method to achieve economic equality; namely, by taxing accumulated private wealth out of existence. However, for each mind
devoted to the development of this end, there is a counterpart concerned

with and devising methods of avoiding, or at least delaying, the inevitable
consequence of such a program. Not the least of these is Professor
Bowe, who has written powerfully respecting tax avoidance by proper
estate planning.1
In this slim volume, he tries again to help resolve some of the more
intricate problems of estate tax planning, this time restricting his discussion entirely to aspects of the use, or failure to use, any of the various
forms of insurance in an estate plan. Even so, it would appear that,
in this book, the author fails to live up to the promise of previous writings. Obviously, in any short work, there is a tendency toward generality, but the material here found, although in many ways helpful, is
much too general to afford any concrete help.
It is all too often assumed, in the text, that an ideal state of affairs
will continue to exist in the estate being planned, so that the suggestions
offered often fail to cope with the potentialities of reality. For example,
there is quite a discussion of the use of insurance as a means of buying
up a business interest in such a manner as to provide liquidity for the
estate and continuity of management in the decedent's beneficiaries. In
particular, the author outlines the device whereby a closely-held corporation, holding insurance on the decedent, may buy up his shares to the
advantage of one and all. Nowhere is there a suggestion that it might
be unlawful for the corporation to buy its shares because of statutory
prohibition or an impairment of the capital structure at the time of the
1 See, for example, Bowe, Tax Planning for Estate (Vanderbilt University Press,

Nashville, Tennessee, 1949), reviewed in 28 CHiCAGO-KENT
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There is no
decedent's death.2 What then is the worth of the plan?
desire to intimate that the book will not prove of interest to the practitioner, the trust man, and the insurance underwriter. There is, however, occasion to feel that the true utility of the work has been sacrificed
for the sake of brevity.

THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS. Benjamin Werne.
millan Company, 1951. Pp. xiv, 741.

New York: The Mac-

Specialization has progressed, in some fields of law, to such an extent
that the general practitioner of today is apt to be considered a dodo or else
finds that he wears the emblem of his general practitionership with discomfort. Law schools must, of necessity, prepare the student for full
legal life but, within the limits of crowded curricula, are unable to include
more than a few particular legal subjects among the general-knowledge
courses.' Modern society, however, treating law as a means of social control, finds it impossible to ignore the overlap, if any there be between gen2
eralized and particularized subjects, and expects lawyers to go afield
just as governments call on others beside political scientists for aid.'
This particularizing of law, with its tendency to make the subject introvertistic, leads to congeries of theories and rules pertaining solely to
specific fields. Eventually, the point is reached where even the proverbial
Philadelphia lawyer throws up his hands and concedes defeat.4
The
specialist's specialist then takes over and the general practitioner finds
2 Scovill, "Treasury. Stock in its Relation to Earned Surplus," 21 CHICAGO-KENT

REvImw 328-32. For a more pragmatic approach to stock purchase plans, see
Davis, Life Insurance and Business Purchase Agreements (National Life Ins. Co.,
Montpelier, Vermont, 1948), 2d Ed.
LAW

' See Currie, "The Materials of Law Study," 3 J. Legal Ed. 331 (1951), for a
discussion of the problems arising from the antagonisms inherent in the general
and the particular approaches.
2 The New York Times, under date of Dec. 20, 1950, reports that Federal District
Judge Wyzanski appointed a Harvard assistant professor of economics as his law
clerk to assist him in the anti-trust suit against the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation.
3 The Full Employment Bill of 1946 makes economists part and parcel of top
governmental policy formulation. Governor Dewey, creating the New York State
Crime Commission, called together a practicing lawyer, a law school dean, a retired
educator, a former police commissioner, and a one-time diplomat.
4 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 at 412,
55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 at 454 (1935), noted how all the parties and the lower
court were unaware of the presence of certain amendments which had been made to
the Petroleum Code because of the absence of a requirement for their publication in
any particular place. As a probable consequence of his remarks, the Federal
Register Act was passed.
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he is ousted from another field of revenue.5 Under these circumstances,
the average lawyer who has been retained in a matter falling within one
of these narrow fields either associates himself with a specialist or attempts
to work alone, endeavoring to combat a specialist on the other side. As
their respective armories are not stocked alike, the odds are weighted
heavily against the uninitiated. To prepare himself, the tyro seeks for
new and specialized weapons or tools. The plethora of texts, guides,
handbooks, digests and the like attest to the prevalence of these conditions
and to the effort that has been made to find some way out of the difficulty.
Labor law is no different from other specialties in this regard. Except on such points as relate to social legislation generally, 6 or to injunctions and picketing7 and other areas where the judicial process is
involved, the field of collective bargaining has itself become specialized to
a degree not dreamt of in pre-Wagner Act days. At first, when bargaining
did not resemble a name-calling jamboree, the prime issues were union
recognition and wages and hours. Following the Wagner Act, experience
with fringe incursions began to develop. The activities of the War Labor
Board and of similar emergency agencies added little that was new. But
since 1945, and under modern conditions, bargaining has become of importance in areas relating to pensions, guaranteed work, grievance procedure and arbitration as well as over the point of disclosure of secret
financial data to unions. Save in certain areas of the South, the principle
expressed in Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act has been generally accepted
and followed. But recognition does not, ipso facto, produce a trade agreement. It is here that labor and management today engage in their most
heated controversies. Whether lawyers will be an aid or an obstruction
in collective bargaining is presently unimportant 8 for the fact is that the
participants generally utilize their services.
Unfortunately, experience gained in general practice in the negotiation of ordinary contracts is not of great value in this particular area for
collective bargaining has created a jargon and an approach that is peculiarly its own. The general practitioner needs must bring the specialist's
5 The resentment may lead to suits such as the case of In re Bercu, 299 N. Y.
728, 87 N. E. (2d) 451 (1949), wherein accountants were prohibited from giving
legal advice on tax questions. The New York County Lawyers Association, through
its Chairman of the Committee on Unlawful Practice, discloses that another front
is being opened with an investigation against estate planners because there is a
"fringe of so-called 'experts' who are neither insurance men nor lawyers" deluding
the public. See 7 Bar Bull. 16 (1949).
6 See the author's article on "Planning and Teaching a Course in Labor Law,"
to appear in the Summer, 1951, issue of the Journal of Legal Education.
7 Forkosch, "Equity versus Taft-Hartley Injunctions," 24 Temp. L. Q. 277 (1951).
8 See Sherman, "The Law Student and Collective Bargaining," 3 J. Legal Ed. 445
(1951).
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tools to bear, else he will not be called again. How, then, can Lawyer X
obtain the essential "know-how"?
He is experienced with the use of
treatises, texts and form books developed in other areas of the law, but
encyclopedic treatises on labor law will provide no help. It is for just
this reason that lesser studies have been made by Dunlop,9 by Tucker, 10
and by Shulman and Chamberlain," to mention only three, in addition to
material which has been compiled in loose-leaf services and legal magazines.
That all such varied attempts have not been completely
successful is
2
attested to by the publication of the instant volume.'
There may be some degree of misnomer in the title of this book if the
reader is led to believe that the work was intended to discuss all of labor's
ramified efforts to better itself. It is primarily the fields of the TaftHartley Act, of collective bargaining, and of the trade agreement which
Mr. Werne has entered, but even these would, ordinarily, be too wide to
cover adequately in a single volume. The book is one, however, geared
to practical use and develops four principal topics, i. e. representation,
prevention of unfair labor practices, rights and duties of management
and unions, and collective contracts. The space allotted to each, approximately one-third for the first two, and one-third each for the third and
fourth, gives some indication of the author's opinion as to their relative
importance.
The first three parts deal almost exclusively with decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board. The discussion is pithy and presents
the law both succinctly and well. While the layman might find himself
lost in the midst of the plentiful documentation, the average lawyer should
find much to aid him to reach a particularized understanding in this field.
But the major questions he will be inclined to ask will be what is the
present status of the law, how up-to-date is the material offered? Although
the book is a 1951 publication, it stops short at about September, 1950.
Later Board determinations have tended to make the work outmoded, but
definitely not obsolete.
For example, in the discussion of secondary boycotts, there is no
mention of the Sterling Beverage or the Schultz Refrigerated Service
cases 13 although the Board made a major policy modification in Senator
9 Dunlop, Collective Bargaining Principles and Cases (Chicago, Richard D. Irwin,
1949).
10 Tucker, Guide to National Labor Relations Act (Chicago, Commerce Clearing
House, 1947). Miss Tucker's excellent compilation, unfortunately, is not up to date.
11 Shulman and Chamberlain, Cases on Labor Relations (Brooklyn, The Foundation Press, Inc., 1949).
12 The author Is Adjunct Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of
Business Administration, New York University.
13 90 N. L. R. B. 75 (1950) and 87 N. L. R. B. 82 (1950), respectively.
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Taft's outright condemnation by accepting to some slight degree the New
York "unity of interest" doctrine. 14 Also missing, although the omission
is understandable, is reference to the fact that the Board, in October,
1950, promulgated standards or requirements to be met before it would
exercise jurisdiction over interstate enterprises too small in character to
warrant the utilization of the Board's limited resources.15 There would also
seem to be no mention of the holdings in the Hughes, Hanke and Gazzam
cases which validate state limitations upon union picketing. 6 The time
factor would make some of these omissions understandable, but others are
not open to that explanation. The presence of error may also be noted.
The author states, at pages 237-8, in relation to the discussion of strikes
and boycotts under Section 8(b) (4) (A-C), that it is the function of the
Board's "regional director" to make application for a temporary injunction, pursuant to Section 10. In fact, the statute specifically provides for
an independent General Counsel whose duty it is to make such decisions
and whose refusal to issue a complaint is final and non-reviewable. It is
more likely that the author meant the "regional attorney" under the
General Counsel rather than the "regional director" of the Board.
Despite these criticisms and other time and error defects, the overall view of the volume is generally good. True, the first three parts offer
nothing the practitioner cannot get elsewhere but the manner of presentation and organization is competent and commendable. It is in the fourth
part, dealing with collective contracts, that the prime worth of the book
is demonstrated. It contains a capable discussion of both the theories and
actualities underlying collective bargaining, covering not only the preparation therefor and the drafting thereof but also the operation thereunder.
Typical contractual clauses have been offered in support of both the
drafting and the operating chapters.1" If a work could be said to concentrate on any one topic so as to place other topics in the shade, the
14 See Forkosch, "Secondary Boycotts Under the Taft-Hartley Law," 1 Labor L. J.
1009 (1951), for a discussion thereof.
15 National Labor Relations Board, Release No. R-357, digests these standards.
The standards were applied to a limited degree in the secondary boycott case of
Jamestown Builders Exchange, 93 N. L. R. B. 51 (1951). See the writer's forthcoming article entitled "National Labor Relations Board Jurisdictional Requirements in Secondary Boycott Cases," to appear in the April, 1951, issue of Labor
Law Journal.
16 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950):
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94
L. Ed. 995 (1950) ; Building Service Employees Internat'l Un. v. Gazzam, 339 U. S.
532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950). As no table of cases appears in the book,
a reader would be obliged to examine almost one hundred pages of footnotes to
verify this fact. The task would be an impossible one for the busy practicing
attorney. The omission should be corrected in a future edition.
17 It might have been worthwhile to have presented a "typical" completed agreement as an appendix, so that the reader could see the independent clauses tied
together into a masterly whole.
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emphasis here is clearly on this part. For that reason, the book should
recommend itself to Lawyer X, for it provides the essential "know how."
While that recommendation is not made entirely without reservation,
the book deserves the characterization of being a workmanlike job quite
likely to aid the uninitiated. In numerous respects it contains a wealth
of information conveniently gathered and ably presented.
MORRis D. FORKOSCH*

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A Comparative Study, Vol. III. Ernst Rabel.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School (Michigan Legal
Studies series). Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1950. Pp. xlvi, 611.
A person who has been privileged to examine the first two volumes of
this monumental comparison of the principles relating to choice of law,
in those fields where one of two or more systems of law may become
applicable, is likely to approach the third volume with preconceived
notions as to the excellence of the material which awaits him. He has
already, on two occasions, been impressed with the wide learning and
indefatigable industry of the author. He has, in like fashion, been led
to see a vast panorama of law unfolding according to a highly articulate,
well-organized plan. The experience received from reading the textual
statement of existing rules, with the frequent illustrations which accompanied the same, and from savoring the author's pungent and incisive
analyses thereof have sharpened his expectation to the point where he is
eager for more. He is now, by the release of the third volume, assured
that his expectations are not to be thwarted or his hopes disappointed in
the slightest.
The second volume closed with an entry into the realm of conflict
of law as applied to contractual situations in general. It recognized
that two principles have come to receive the widest recognition; those of
party autonomy, or the right to choose the applicable law, on the one
hand, and the so-called "point of contact" doctrine, by which the contract is to be governed by the law most closely connected with its chief
features, on the other. The third volume carries that thought forward
into a discussion of specialized contract problems such as relate to contracts for the payment of money, the sale of movables and immovables,
of agency and employment, including workmen's compensation, of carriage
by land and sea, of insurance, and of suretyship, as well as to contractuallike rights and duties arising from unjust enrichment. The book closes
with an extended treatment of modification and discharge of contracts by
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
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such matters as assignment, subrogation, novation, counterclaim and bar
by limitation.
There is no sign from the author that he relents, in any way, concerning his attitude against the use of mechanical and ill-fitted rules or the
bolstering of obsolete concepts with ridiculous presumptions. He can, and
does, still take issue in not infrequent measure with the provincialisms
of the Restatement. His mastery of both the processes and the needs of
international trade, commerce and finance, his grasp of legal history and
legal developments are made evident on every page. It is only fair to say,
however, that as the work progresses it becomes more difficult for the
reader to follow every thought as the subject matter becomes that much the
more complex. Here is no simple black-letter text to while away the student's, or lawyer's, time; more nearly, it may prove to be a challenge he
could not meet. He would, though, be the stronger for having made the
attempt. If nothing else be gained, he might learn that the American view
of the subject is not the only one and, frequently, not the best one either.
WATER RESOURCES LAW, Vol. III. Water Resources Policy Commission.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950. Pp. xviii,
777, paper.
Pursuant to Executive Order, the Water Resources Policy Commission has been engaged in preparing a series of reports relating to the water
resources and water needs of the nation. The third of such reports has
now been released in the form of a complete review of all existing waterresources legislation. It provides a comprehensive view of the numerous
laws, both state and federal, which, regardless of date of enactment or
actual impact on the subject, in any way concern the nation's water supply. Prepared in impersonal style, the report assembles a vast body of
material relating either to statutory regulation or to development of water
use, water power, drainage, flood control, navigation, land use and soil conservation. It is supplemented by extensive tables, indices and summaries.
While many of the points discussed will have slight concern for the
mid-western area of the continent, being more important in the west where
control of the water supply may be vital to life itself, the summary is
one which should receive attention in every part of the nation. The hodgepodge of legislation on the subject alone, as revealed by this study, should
call for clarifying action. Waste arising from duplication of effort, if
not from direct conflict in responsibility, stands stark on almost every
page. Shifts in constitutional emphasis from the exercise of a clear power
over interstate commerce to specious reliance on the nebulous general welfare clause bespeak of historical change in the approach to the subject

BOOK REVIEWS

of development and regulation of water supply. A growth in bureaucratic
power is also to be noted, even to the point where administrative discretion in such matters has become of virtually unlimited character.
The raw materials of this report, then, present a picture which discloses urgent need for a major revision in both scope and policy in order
that integration might not only eliminate conflicts and duplications in
authority but so that the gaps might be filled. The report itself draws
the conclusion that the "interests of present and future generations demand it."
The legal profession will, undoubtedly, await future recommendations as to the form such revision should take. In the meantime, it
has, through this report, been furnished with materials from which it
might assemble its own conclusions.
Robert N. Cook.
Inc., 1951. Pp. xxxvii, 867.

LEGAL DRAFTING.

Brooklyn: The Foundation Press,

The "innocent" bystander who will project himself into a stream
of flying brickbats at a Donnybrook Fair has no one to blame for the
lumps he suffers than himself. Such a "fair" has been raging for over a
year between practicing lawyers on the one hand, utilizing the columns
of the American Bar Association Journal for their vantage paint,1 and
members of the law teaching profession, speaking through the pages of
the Journal of Legal Education,2 on the other. The pretext, if one is
ever needed for a good fight, turns on the capacity, or lack of capacity,
on the part of the typical law school graduate to perform the tasks besetting the practitioner the moment he receives the coveted license and
undertakes to represent clients. The criticism proceeds, aside from any
alleged general lack of ability, from the standpoint that the tyro is illequipped to translate his theoretical knowledge of law into the actualities
to be faced in the daily routine of the law office.' The reply when not
couched in terms of confession and avoidance, is that the subject matter is not one capable of development in the professional school but must
await field training in the actual workshops of the law. This reviewer
refuses to expose himself to the dangers adhering to a life in the no-man's
1 See Roberts, "Performance Courses in the Study of Law," 36 A. B. A. J. 17
(1950); Connor, "Legal Education for What?" 37 A. B. A. J. 119 (1951) ; and
Cutler, "Inadequate Law School Training," 37 A. B. A. J. 203 (1951).
2 Compare the papers mentioned in note 1, ante, with Wilson, "A Practical Practice Court Course," 3 J. Legal Ed. 285 (1950) ; Shestock, "Legal Research and Writing," 3 J. Legal Ed. 126 (1950) ; MacDonald, "The Professional Aspects of Legal Education," 2 J. Legal Ed. 444 (1950) ; Miller, "Clinical Training of Law Students," 2
J. Legal Ed. 298 (1950) ; Cavers, "'Skills' and Understanding," 1 J. Legal Ed. 395
(1949) ; Kalven, "Law School Training in Research and Exposition," 1 J. Legal Ed.
107 (1948). MacDonald, 2 J. Legal Ed. 444 at 451, states: ". . . I do not believe
that law schools can do very much of real value in this regard, because of their
inability to simulate the conditions of actual practice."
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land between these armed camps, nor wishes to suffer from the rapid
exchange going on between these verbal charges and retorts. There is
much to be said on either side.
It would seem as if Professor Cook, 4 from a similar recognition of
the fact that there is some merit to these charges, has worked conscientiously toward a solution. A year or so back, reporting on the development
of a course in legal writing at Western Reserve University, he stated that
his description thereof was "necessarily a still picture of a growing
thing. Only the general directions of this growth have been indicated." 5
It is now possible, with the publication of his book, to announce that the
outlines of the picture and the record of that growth may now be seen
more sharply defined.
Here is no form book replete with ill-fitting clauses of ancient vintage
awaiting to be assembled by the draftsman into a crazy-quilt vestment
for the client's affairs. Here is no style book in composition, stuffed
with boresome and pedantic rules concerning syntax, punctuation and the
like. But the essence of these things, the large and small principles
which should govern legal writing, are presented in stimulating fashion
not for the ,guidance of students alone but for the practicing lawyer too.
The materials, as Professor Llewellyn has noted in his introduction, offer
a full background, an exploration into the policies and the problems involved in the drafting of a wide variety of legal forms, an elaborate
check list of what to look out for, and frequent suggestions for lines
of wise action in type after type of transaction. Case law is not neglected,
but the emphasis is not thereon. The material is all there; all that remains is to put it to use and the result should silence much of the furor to
be found in the cannonading referred to above.
3 Says Roberts, 36 A. B. A. J. 17 at 20, the graduate "...
'passed' contracts, but
he never wrote one ... He may have led his class in wills, yet, he has never prepared one ... His course in trusts has been similar, but his knowledge of how to
prepare the necessary documents for their establishment and execution is even
smaller than his knowledge of decedent's estates." Cutler, 37 A. B. A. J. 203 at 204,
adds: "All the theory in the world ill equips the lawyer who has all the legal lore
at his fingertips, but [who] doesn't know how to draw a summons, a will, a deed
or a bill of sale. To know the cy pres doctrine ... is a necessary part of a lawyer's
legal background. It is also important that he know how to use the words required
in a simple petition to appoint an administrator of an estate." He offers, as his
solution, a period of apprenticeship dealing with actual matters in a law office under
the supervision of a member of the bar prior to the granting of the license.
4 Yes, the author is one of the schoolmen, not of the practitioner class, being a
member of the faculty of law at Western Reserve University. He is, but not to his
shame, one of those whom Connor, 37 A. B. A. J. 119, would point to with a degree
of scorn for having "only one year of practice" or for revealing "no experience in
the practice of law at all !" The author's practical experience is somewhat broader,
but not by much. See biographical details in Teachers' Directory, Association of
American Law Schools, 1950-51, p. 83. The book in question should prove that the
theorist can also get practical.
5 Cook. "Teaching Legal Writing Effectively In Separate Courses," 2 J. Legal Ed.
87 (1949), at 91.

